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INTRODUCTION

Since history is essentially a record of man in action, it is
subject to interpretation.
interpretations.

Controversies naturally develop from differing

Therefore, one of the most vital tasks of modern his

torical analysis is to present the conflicting views concerning some of
these major disputes.

Such studies help future historisLns to evaluate

the events of the past more effectively.

These controversies, more

over, are of particular interest to the readers of history because they
involve not only significant events but also colorful characters.
Fev» Americans have been involved in as many controversial situa
tions as Andrew Jackson, the frontier lawyer-soldier who became the
seventh president of the United States.
troversies are;

Some of these Jacksonian con

1) Was Jackson truly the Great Democrat, or did he

merely pose as such in order to advance himself politically?

2) Was

Jackson the military genius that his admirers claimed, or was he only
in league with the tides of good fortune?

3) Was Jackson morally justi

fied in seizing posts in Spanish Florida in 1818, or did he act on his
own responsibility in order to further his own selfish desires?

4) Was

Jackson legally justified in his Florida adventure, or did he violate
the Constitution of the United States by his impulsive acts?

5) Was

Jackson correct in claiming that he had received the "Rhea letter" in
February, 1818, or was this famous epistle actually a hoax?

6) Was

Jackson justified in bringing the government down to the level of the
common man, or did the evils of the "spoils system" offset this obvious
good?

and 7) Was Jackson correct in killing the Bank of the United
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States, or did he perform a lasting disservice to the economic well-being
of his country by his action?
Ihis study deals with the third, fourth, and fifth of the fore
going controversies.

In 181? the Georgia-Alabama frontier was being

plagued by difficulties that were mainly an outgrowth of the trouble with
the Creek Indians during the War of 1812.

When General Jackson was

directed by the War Department to rid the southern border of the menace
of hostile Indians, Negroes, and foreign adventurers, his orders per
mitted him to cross the line into Spanish Florida, if necessary, but
not to attack any Spanish garrisons .

VUhen he apparently transcended

his orders by seizing several posts, he was accused of acting on his
own initiative and of violating the laws of our nation.
The events that followed were influenced by the fact that the
United States government was then negotiating with Spain for the pur
chase of Florida.

The general's actions brought sharp protests from

the Spanish and hindered the treaty-making that was taking place.

Also,

the personal popularity of the hero of New Orleans introduced political
facets that could not be ignored by the leaders of that day.

The dis

cussion of the Florida invasion went through a full cycle of cabinet
meetings and congressional hearings.

During these lengthy proceedings,

many reasons for defending Jackson were submitted.
the critics of the hero were just as active.

On the other hand,

Several years after

the affair had apparently been closed, Jackson claimed that he had
received a secret authorization in 1818 from President Jsunes Monroe to
seize all of Florida.

This statement was brought forth in 1830-1831

in the midst of a bitter political struggle between Jackson and John
C. Calhoun.
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This study in historiography will attempt to review the argtiments
used in defense of Jackson's seizure of the posts.

It will also examine

the numerous criticisms levelled against the chieftain.

In addition,

opinions will be explored concerning the existence of the famous "Rhea
letter."

These goals will be accomplished by analyzing the viewpoints of

the contemporary figures, and of subsequent biographers and historians.
The first chapter will present the historical background of the Florida
affair-

This material is essential to the study because historiauas have

been affected in their judgments by their interpretations of this back
ground.

Chapter two will deal with the views of the major characters of

the Jackson era on the justification of the general.

Again, later writers

have been influenced by the light in which they saw these figures.

Chap

ters three and four will offer the views of the biographers and historians
from 1819 until the present.

Finally, the last chapter will summarize the

findings, and will attempt to indicate any changing trends in the inter
pretations of the writers.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Jackson's controversial invasion of East Florida in 1818 had its
roots in two chronic American preoccupations of the nineteenth century:
territorial expansion, and the Indian problem.
After the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, Americans looked hungrily
at Spanish Florida.

In 1810 the Madison Administration acquired West

Florida through dubious but effective means.^

Inspired by this success,

Madison apparently tried to achieve a similar result in East Florida in
p
1812 by scarcely more honorable methods.
After these efforts failed,
the United States resorted to orthodox diplomacy.

But, in view of the

Spanish skill in delaying tactics. East Florida still had not come under
American control by 1818.

In January of that year. Secretary of State

John Quincy Adams intensified the efforts of the United States to secure
the cession of East Florida now as part of a sweeping Spanish-American
settlement.

At that time, Adams and Luis de Onis, the Spanish Minister,

3
resumed negotiations for a treaty.
While the diplomats were meeting in Washington, the Florida•^Abbot Emerson Smith, James Madison:
Erickson, 1937), pp- 293-94.

Builder (New York:

^Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York:
Co., pp. 79-85.

Wilson-

The Macmillein

^Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of
American Foreign Policy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 301-09.
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Georgia border became a focal point for Indian raids.

The occasion for

the trouble was the continuing Indian resentment against the Treaty of
Fort Jackson.

Signed on August 9, 1814, it had brought to a close the

struggle of the American frontiersmen against the Creek Indians.

This

agreement had stipulated that the redmen would vacate about half of
their domain in the Georgia-Alabama region.

Vftiile the treaty had seemed

harsh to some of the tribes, the majority had accepted the outcome withL

out incident.

Certain renegade Creeks, however, had fled from their

Alabama homes and had joined the warlike Seminoles across the thirtyfirst parallel in Spanish Florida.

The Indians had then carried out

numerous raids in Georgia and Alabama to indicate their displeasure with
the treaty.^
Influence exerted by foreigners also apparently intensified the
hostility of the redmen toward the American whites.

The Spanish author

ities in Florida had sided with the Indians in their dispute with the
United States.

This had been evidenced as early as September 29, 1813,

when Maxeo Gonzales Manxique, the governor of Florida, wrote to the
Creek chiefs:

"I received the letter you wrote me in the month of

August, by which, and with great satisfaction, I was informed of the advantages which your brave warriors obtained over your enemies."

In

addition, two British subjects, Alexander Arbuthnot, an aged Scotch

^John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 124.

The

^Ibid.. pp. 234-40.
^James A.Parton, A Life of Andrew Jackson (3 vols.; New York:
Mason Bros., 1859-1860), I, 420. This letter was found among the papers
of Governor William C. Claiborne of Louisiana.
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trader, and Robert C. Ambrister, a young adventurer, were allegedly using
7
their influence to incite the warriors to dispute American authority.
The antagonisms were brought to a head in 181? by a canbination of
events.

Fowltown, an Indian village with some particularly independent

inhabitants, lay on the American side of the new line drawn by the Treaty
of Fort Jackson.

Its chief gave notice to the American commandant at

Fort Scott, Major D. E. Twiggs, that the land taken by the Americans was
his and that he would resist all attempts to deprive him of it.

The com

mander of all the troops in this area. Brigadier General Edmund P. Gaines,
treated this hostile attitude as a declaration of war, and ordered Major
Twiggs with 250 men to seize the defiant chief.

Twiggs reached Fowltown

on November 21, 1817, and was fired upon by the Indians.

The ensuing

skirmish resulted in four warriors being slain and several being wounded.
Q

After reporting this action, Gaines then waited for further orders.

Consequently, the Seminoles and Creeks now went on the warpath.

A

few days after the incident at Fowltown, a detachment of American soldiers
enroute to Fort Scott was ambushed and massacred by an Indian war party.9
On December 2, 1817, an order was issued to Gaines to proceed against the
redmen, but not to cross the Florida line.^^

On December 16, a new order

authorized Gaines to enter Florida if necessary, and to pursue the Indians
to the Spanish posts but to stop there for further instructions.^
^Marquis James, Andrew Jackson« the Border Captain (Indianapolis;
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1933), pp. 309-12.
°Bassett, Life of Jackson, pp. 244-45•
'^William P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill:
North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 303.

The University of

S. Congress, American State Papers, Class V, Military Affairs
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), I, 685-86.
^Ibid.. p. 689.
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In the meantime John C. Calhoun had replaced Secretary of War
George Graham.

After acquainting himself with the situation, Calhoun

transferred the command to General Jackson vsho, on December 26, 1817;
was resting at the Hermitage.

Jackson's orders were merely a repetition

of those previously issued, plus the following directive:

"With this

view, you may be prepared to concentrate your forces, and to adopt the
necessary measures to terminate the conflict which it has been the de
sire of the President, from considerations of humanity, to avoid, but
12
which is now made necessary by their settled hostilities."
Jackson, as commanding general of the Southern Division, had re
ceived through War Department channels a copy of the orders to General
Gaines even before the command was transferred.

Jackson foresaw the

danger of moving his troops near the Spanish posts without being allowed
to attack the garrisons.

With this in view he wrote to President James

Monroe on January 6, 1818:
Will you, however, permit me to suggest the catastrophe
that might arise by General Gaines• compliance with the last
clause of your order? Suppose the case that the Indians are
beaten they take refuge either in Pensacola or St. Augustine,
which open their gates to them to profit by his victory. General
Gaines pursues the fugitives, and has to halt before the garrison
until he can communicate with his government. In the meantime
the militia grows restless, and he is left to defend himself by
the regulars. The enemy, with the aid of their Spanish friends
and Woodbine's ^aptain Georg^ British partizans, or, if you
please, with Aury's force, attacks him. What may not be the re
sult? Defeat and massacre. Permit me to remark that the arms
of the United States must be carried to any point within the
limits of East Florida, where an enemy is permitted and protected,
or disgrace attends. . .Let it be signified to me through any
channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of the Florida's
would be desirable to the United States and in sixty days it

^2ibid., p. 690.
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Twill be accomplished.13
Due to the slow postal service, Calhoun's orders of December 26,
1817, had not reached the Hermitage before Jackson's letter was sent.

If

they had, the comprehensive nature of these War Department directives
might have given the general the green light he desired and could possibly
have eliminated from history the "Rhea letter" controversy.^

Such -was

not the case, hovnever, and the story of the letter and its influence on
politics for the next dozen years is as bizarre as a fictitious thrillerWhen Jackson's letter arrived in Washington, Monroe was indisposed.
After he had read "one or two lines only"^^ of the letter, he handed it
to Calhoun for his perusal.

William H. Crawford of Georgia, the Secre

tary of the Treasury, now entered the room.

Crawford was shown the

letter, but neither he nor Calhoun commented on the contents.

The

missive was then "filed and forgotten by me,"^^ according to the Presi
dent.

His alleged failure to read the letter touched off a chain of

events destined to bring sorrow to himself on his deathbed thirteen years
later.

This apparent oversight on the part of Monroe later became the

subject of considerable comment by historians.
Calhoun and Crawford were later to quarrel over the accuracy of

^Bassett (ed.)«Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (6 vols.;
Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935 (The italics
are mine.)
^Richard R Stenberg, "Jackson's 'Rhea Letter' Hoax," Journal of
Southern History, II (November, 1936), 480.
^^Thomas Hart Benton, Th^ty Years' View (2 vols.; New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1854-1856), I, 170.
^^Stanislaus M. Hamilton (ed.). The Writings of James Monroe (7
vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), VII, 209.
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the story of the meeting in Monroe's sick room.

This dispute began in

1827, and directly affected the eventual break between Calhoun and
Jackson.
In the meantime, the Georgia-Alabama frontier was bustling with
activity.

Jackson, instead of proceeding to take command of the troops

in Georgia, sent out a call for Tennessee volunteers.

The general was

acting on his personal responsibility, as the governor was absent at
the time.^'^

This was "in disregard of positive orders" according to

18

the Lacock report to the Senate in February, 1819.

Finally, the ad

vance guard of Jackson's reinforcements bivouacked on the bank of Big
Creek, about four miles from Hartford, Georgia, on February 13, 1818.
There Jackson received a packet of mail among which, he later claimed,
was a letter from Rhea transmitting Monroe's authorization for the
seizure of Florida.

Advancing swiftly, Jackson's force seized the

Spanish garrison at St. Marks on April 17, 1818.

Here he also captured

Arbuthnot and Ambrister, the Britishers who were accused of stirring up
the Indians.

These men were summarily tried and executed, much to the

consternation of the Washington officials subsequently concerned with
no
the legality of Jackson's actions. '
Returning to Fort Gadsden, Jackson prepared to go back to
Tennessee.

Then, "I received information that five hundred and fifty

Indians had collected in Pensacola, was [sic^ fed by the Governor,

l^james. The Border Captain, p. 308.
S. Congress, Annals of Congress, 15th Congress, 2nd. Sess.,
Vol. I, 1818-1819 (Washington; Gales and Seaton, 1855), 258. (Here
after cited as U. 3. Congress, Annals.)
James, The Border Captain, pp. 313-14.
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and a party furnished by the Governor had issued forth and in one night
20
slaughtered eighteen of our citizens. ..."

Hence, with haste the

Americans raced to Pensacola, seizing the garrison with only a minimum
of resistance.

The surrender of the Spanish

post occurred on May 28,

1818—twenty three days after the information concerning the Indian ac
tivity at Pensacola had reached Jackson's ears.

Thus, within a few weeks,

Jackson had captured important Spanish posts in Florida, ousted the
Spanish governor, seized the Spanish archives, and executed two British
subjects.
Our governmental officials were evidently unprepared for the storm
that followed.

Word of Jackson's deeds reached Washington during the

last week of June, 1818.

Monroe's reaction to the startling news was

well expressed in a letter written to James Madison on July 1, 1818, the
very day that he was informed at his country home at Loudon of the in
vasion.

This missive reads in part:

General Jackson's report is received in consequence of
which I shall return to Washington on Monday next, the 13th He imputes the whole Seminole War to the interference and ex
citement by the Spanish authorities in the Floridas, of the
Indians, together with that of the foreign adventurers imposing
themselves on those people for the agents of foreign powers. I
have no doubt that his opinion is correct, though, he has not
made his case as strong as I am satisfied he might have done.
There are serious difficulties in the business, on which ever
side we view it. The motive for pressing Spain in the present
state of affairs, having the Mississippi, Florida, etc.,
founded on the interest of the country, is not urgent, but the
sense of injury from her and of insult, together with the desire
of aiding the Colonies by pressing her strong.

^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 3^4•
2ljames, The Border Captain, p. 315*
^%amilton. Writings of Monroe. VI, 53-54*
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In the meantime, the Spanish representative at Washington had be
gun to press for action.

On the night of July 7 the Spanish Minister,

/

Don Luis de Onis, "who had hurriedly returned to Washington from his
summer home at Bristol, Pennsylvania, demanded that the captured posts
be returned to Spain, that an indemnity be paid for all injuries sind
losses, and that Jackson be punished for his misdeeds.23
Monroe now decided to call together the cabinet in order to dis
cuss the course that the administration would follow in respect to the
Florida invasion.

In the cabinet meetings that ensued, Jackson's

champion was the man whom the casual observer would least expect to play
such a role.
cated Jackson.

John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, alone vindi
The new Englander was completely disgusted with Spanish

insolence and the humiliating delays he had been forced to endure in the
QI
negotiations for the purchase of Florida.
An eminent American his
torian, James B. Schouler, offered a threefold explanation of Adams'
stand:
It may have been weariness with the dragging negotiations
committed to him and contempt for the Spanish monarch whose
beggarly insolence tempted us to unrag him of his tattered
colonial possessions; it may have been a wise forecast of Jack
son's popularity at home; but unquestionably the grim Puritan,
who saw through the false glitters of courts and diplomacy,
owned fellowship in his heart with the warrior whose scourge
had been laid so fearlessly upon the backs of our ill-disguised
enemies.^5
Consequently, the Secretary insisted that, inasmuch as the government
had granted Jackson discretionary power to enter Florida, it was responIbid., p. 61.
^Cresson, Monroe, p. 312.
James B, Schouler, A History of the United States of America
(7 vols.; New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1894-1913), III, 78.
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sible for his acts.

26)

On July 8, 1818, Adams added in a letter to

Monroe that Jackson had found it necessary to take action when the
Spanish governor had threatened to use force against him.27
Secretary of War Calhoun principally bore the argument against
Jackson.

He insisted that the general had violated the Constitution by

28
waging -war against the Spanish posts.

Despite this, Calhoun later

posed as a friend of the hero during the Congressional hearings and in
political cajnpaigns.

These factors had political repercussions a num

ber of years laterThe other cabinet members—Crawford, Williajn Wirt and Benjamin W.
Crovuninshield—substantially agreed -with Calhoun, although Crawford
later stated that his own views changed moderately in the course of the
meetings.

Despite his previous enmity for Jackson, Crawford soon began

to support the general.

29

This change in attitude was possibly due to

his increasing fear of Calhoun as a rival aspiraint for the presidency.
During these politically affected sessions, Monroe acted as
"both the pacifier and director of the angry and brilliant men who
30
formed his cabinet."

York:

After listening to their arguments, Monroe

^^William H. Seward, Life and Services of John Quincy Adams (New
Miller, Orton, and Mulligan, 1856), p. 120.

^'^Worthington C, Ford (ed.). The Writings of John Quincy Adams
(7 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913-1917)> VI, 384^%erman von Hoist, John C. Calhoun, from The American Statesman
Series. ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1899), p. 98.
29parton, Life of Jackson. II, 509.
^^George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feeling (New York:
Brace, and Co., 1952), p. 326.

Harcourt,

13
adopted a compromise position.

He decided to restore the Florida posts

31
to Spain, and to avoid a court-martial for Jackson.

The President

also concluded that Adams should negotiate with Spain, which was in
sisting that a more satisfactory explanation be received from "Old
Hickory."

Moreover, Monroe assigned himself a two-fold task:

to

appease Jackson, whose pride had been injured by the restoration of the
posts; and to persuade him to amplify the reports which he had written
on June 2, 1818.

32
These had not presented the American case adequately.

Monroe's tactfulness made it possible for him to handle effectively the
succeeding events.
The next six months were to see a repeated exchange of letters
between the President and his general.
his gargantuan task.

On July 19, 1818, Monroe began

The President realized that it would not be easy

to convince the general that he had acted wisely in restoring the posts
to Spain.

He also realized the near-impossibility of convincing Jackson

that he had overstepped the bounds of his authority.

His lengthy letter

was apologetic and timidly written, probably because Monroe also feared
33
the general, and with good reasonThe President began by explaining
3lMonroe had well expressed the final views of himself and the
cabinet in a letter written to Thomas Jefferson on July 22, 1818: "It
has appeared to be altogether improper, to hold the posts, as that would
amount to a decided act of hostility, and might be considered a usurpa
tion of the powers of Congress. To go to the other expreme has appeared
to be equally improper, that is to bring General Jackson to trial, for
disobedience of orders, as he acted on facts which were unknown to the
government when his orders were given, many of which indeed occasion'd
afterwards, and as his trial, unless he should ask it himself, would be
a triumph of Spain, and confirm her in the disposition not to cede
Florida." Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VI, 63.
32Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson. II, 378.
^^James, The Border Captain, p. 318.
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the necessity for the correspondence.

After this meek opening, Monroe

added this "punch line":
In calling you into active service against the Seminoles,
cind communicating to you the orders which had been given just be
fore to General Gaines, the views and intentions of the government
were fully disclosed in respect to the operations in Florida. In
transcending the limit prescribed by those orders you acted on
your own responsibility, on facts and circumstances which were un
known to the government when the orders were given, many of which,
indeed, occurred afterwards, and which you thought imposed on you
the measure, as an act of patriotism, essential to the honor and
interests of your country.
The President continued by justifying the invasion of Spanish territory:
The United States stand justified in ordering troops into
Florida in pursuit of their enemy- They have this right by the law
of nations, if the Seminoles were inhabitants of another country
and had entered to elude pursuit. . .But an order by the govern
ment to attack a Spanish post would assume another character. It
would authorize war, to vhich by the principles of our Constitution,
the Executive is incompetent.34
Yet Monroe was prone to give the general every opportunity to ex
plain his actions.

He blamed

"Old Hickory's" failure to communicate

full details to his haste and fatigue.
dent suggested:

So in the same letter, the Presi

"If you think proper to authorize the Secretary

(Calhoun) or myself to correct those passages, it will be done with care,
though, should you have copies, as I presume you have, you had better do
it yourself."

35

Monroe wanted Jackson to be satisfied, and yet at the

same time he desired to protect himself and his administration in the
eyes of Congress and of Spain by mildly rebuking the impulsive chieftain.
Monroe wanted Florida but he wanted it legally.
friendship as well as the support of Congress.

He also wanted Jackson's
The President was certain

^^Hamilton, Writings of Monroe. VI, 55-56.
3^Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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that the invasion of Florida was legal but he did not approve the
seizing of the posts, at least not at this time.
Jackson's reaction to the letter was typical.

He refused to ad

mit that he had done anything that had not been authorized or justified.
Consequently, in the reply to Monroe, written on August 19, 1818, he
stated that his "orders had been comprehensive and not detailed."37

He

later referred to Calhoun's cryptic note of December 26, 181?—"adopt
the necessary measures to terminate the conflict. . .

This, to the

General provided grounds for justifying his actions.
Meanwhile, as the pressure from Spain eased somewhat, Calhoun
adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and Monroe prepared another
epistle.

On October 20, 1818, the President wrote;

I was sorry to find that you understood your instructions
relative to operation in Florida differently from what we in
tended. I was satisfied, however, that you had good reason for
your conduct, and have acted in all things on the principle. By
suggesting that you understood them as we did, I concluded that
you proceeded on your own responsibility alone, in which, knowing
the purity of your motives I have done all I could to justify the
measure. I well knew, also, the misconduct of the Spanish authori
ties in that quarter, not of recent date only.39
As Monroe was anxious for Jackson to make his own case stronger, he
added:
The best course to be pursued seems to me for you to vfrite
a letter to the Department, in which you will state that, having
reason to think that a difference of opinion existed between you
and the Executive, relative to the extent of your powers, you
thought it due to yourself to state your view of them, and on

^^Bassett, Life of Jackson« pp. 243-44^'^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson. I, 395.
3Qlbid.. II, 342.
^%amilton. Writings of Monroe. VI, 74.
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which you acted. This will be answered, so as to explain ours, in
a friendly manner by Mr- Calhoun, who has very just and liberal
sentiments on the subject. This will be necessary in the case of
a call for papers by Congress, as may be. Thus we shall all stand
on the ground of honor, each doing justice to the other, which is
the ground on which we wish to place each other-^®
Calhoun now was brought into the picture as the peacemaker rather than
the antagonist.

This seemingly minor bit of deceit was to play a domi

nant role in the political dispute that followed several years later.
Although somewhat mollified by Monroe's smooth talk, Jackson
never-the-less stuck to his guns on the matter of justification.

In a

letter written on November 15, 1818, he protested his affection for the
President and in the same breath insisted that he had acted only for the
good of his country.

Jackson was convinced that the proposed corres

pondence with the Secretary of War would prove his point, so he agreed
to begin writing his views.Later, in his message to Congress on
November 16, 1818, Monroe defended Jackson's action.^

The general then

wrote that he "highly approvedthe President's message, signifying
that the men had reached a mutual understanding.

The chain of letters

between the two men ended on December 21, 1818, when Monroe wrote that
the proposed correspondence with the Secretary of War would be unneces
sary.^

This indicated that the President felt that the general's

^Qlbid.. p. 75.
^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 398.
42janies D. Richardson (ed.). Messages and Papers of the Presidents
(11 vols.; Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1900),
II, 611.
^^Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VII, 171.
^Ibid.
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position was solid at that time.

This series of documents, vnhich con

tained not one hint of a presidential authorization through John Rhea,
was to be of major importance to historians.
During the negotiations between Monroe and Jackson, Congress re
convened for a "lame duck" session.

As might be expected, both Houses

prepared to examine the invasion of Florida.

Hence, the ensuing Con

gressional activities had important future ramifications from the
political standpoint.

On December 18, 1818, a senatorial committee

consisting of Abner Lacock (Pa.), John Henry Eaton (Tenn.), John
Forsyth (Ga.), Rufus King (N. Y.)> and James Burrill, Jr. (R. I.), was
appointed to examine the Seminole proceedings.^^

Lacock, the chairman,

was a quiet and dignified Pennsylvanian who cared not one whit for
Jackson's threat to "cut off the ears" of critical s e n a t o r s T h e
presence on the committee of John Henry Eaton, Jackson's close friend
and erstwhile biographer, did not prevent the group, after a careful
study of all available data, from returning a report critical of "Old
Hickory's" deeds.Eventually, on February 24, 1819, their findings
were read before the Senate.

In part the committee declared:

It is with regret that the committee are compelled to declare
that they conceive General Jackson to have disregarded the positive
orders of the Department of War, the Constitution and laws. . . .
Your committee will dismiss this branch of the subject by observing
that, consistently with the character and genius of our government,
no officer however high or exalted his station, can be justified for
an infraction of the Constitution; it is an offense against the
sovereignty of the nation, this sovereignty being vested in the

S, Congress, Annals, p. 76.
James, The Border Captain, p. 325.
^'^U. S. Congress, Annals. pp. 255-68.
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great body of the people.^®
The lengthy report went on to chide Jackson—"We hope better things of
the distinguished officer at the head of our armies, and we had hoped
better things of the hero of New Orleans, but we have been disappoint
ed. .
The report infxiriated Jackson, and the support of his admirers
tended to increase his feeling against the committee.

The administra

tion gracefully forestalled any action until the session of Congress
closed, and, as the question was not brought up again in the Senate, the
Lacock report served no other function than to widen the breach between
Jackson and his outspoken critics.
The administration was unable to curb the House, however.

On

January 12, 1819, the House Committee on Military Affairs submitted a
series of resolutions disapproving the Jacksonian treatment of the
Florida affairs, after a resolution praising Jackson's actions had
failed in committee by only one vote.^^

Early sentiment preceding the

House debates indicated that Jackson would have powerful support as well
as eloquent antagonists.

The ensuing debate, which lasted several weeks,

became the principal item on the House's daily agenda.
ous critic of the old soldier was Henry Clay.

The most vocifer

Although the Kentuckian

protested that he had nothing personal against the general, he proceeded
to tear "Old Hickory" apaxt verbally.This earned Clay the undying

48ibid., pp. 258-59.
^^Ibid., p. 266.
^^Ibid., p. 518.
^^Ibid.. pp. 631-55.
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hatred of Jackson.

On the other hand, the most gifted speech in de

fense of the chieftain was by Representative George Poindexter of
52
Mississippi.^

After the lengthy debate, Jackson -was absolved on all

counts, and the Congressional probe ended.
Several years later, Jackson's invasion of Florida becaune en
tangled in contemporary politics.

The ensuing partisan developments

have influenced the appraisals of historians in their consideration of
the events of 1818, and hence must be treated at some length.

During a

political quarrel with Calhoiin in 1827j Crawford made reference to the
Carolinian's role in the cabinet meetings of July, 1818.^^

While Jack

son was not directly and immediately informed of Crawford's charges, the
feuding politicians were certain to bring them to his attention.

When

Jackson was elected in 1828 with Calhoun as his running mate, he again
heard hints of Calhoun's duplicity in the affair, but he did not believe
them to be true.
As early as 1826 a letter from Monroe to Calhoun had been made
known to Jackson.

This note, written on September 9j 1818, had criti

cized Jackson's conduct, but Jackson did not believe that his Vice-Pres
ident had agreed with Monroe.Then during the January 8 celebration in
New Orleans in 1828, commemorating Jackson's victory over the British in
1815, Colonel James A. Hamilton of New York and Major William B. Lewis of
Tennessee heard rumors that Crawford had accused Calhoun of wanting to

^^Ibid., pp. 935-85.
^^Ibid., p. 1138.
^^Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (3 vols.j Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944-1951), II, 76-79.
55Basset, Life of Jackson, p. 501.

The
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court-martial the general in 1818.^^

On the yiay home Hamilton decided to

go by way of Georgia and speak to Crawford.

As the latter was not home,

Hamilton asked Governor John Forsyth to carry a message to Crawford, re
questing information on the position of Calhoun in 1818.

Soon Hamilton

received a letter from Forsyth confirming the rumors about Calhoun's
anti-Jackson stand.

Lewis now decided to keep the letter secret until

after the election in November in order to protect Jackson's chances of
57
winning. '
As the tension between the Jacksonians and Caliioun increased dur
ing the first months of the new administration, Lewis informed "Old
Hickory" of the matter-

Jackson demanded to see the Forsyth letter but

permission had to be received from both Forsyth and Crawford.

This was

not granted until April 30, 1830, when Crawford wrote to the President.
Crawford's letter arrived at a time inopportune for the VicePresident. His relations with Jackson were continuing to deteriorate
from the combined effects of Martxn Van Buren's ambitions,
60
6l
affair,
and the nullification controversy.

59

the Eaton

Consequently, after

reading Crawford's charges, Jackson immediately wrote to Calhoun

^^Ibid.. pp. 502-05.
^'^Ibid.. pp. 506-07.
^^Ibid., pp. 508-09.
59
•^ Edward M. Shepard, Martin Van Buren. from The American Statesman
Series. ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1899), p. 18?.
^^^Wrgaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 193.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun. II, 112-13.
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demanding an eaqplanation.

Rather than take the normal recourse of

maintaining cabinet secrecy, Calhoun proceeded to pen such lame excuses
that Jackson closed off their correspondence and their friendship.
"Old Hickory" wrote to the Vice-President on May 30, 1830:
In all your (previous) letters to me (you have) professed
to approve. . .entirely my conduct in relation to the Seminole
campaign. . .Your letter now before me is the first intimation
that you ever entertained any other opinion. . .Understanding you
nom, no further communication with you on this subject is neces
sary.
As Jackson and Calhoun feverishly prepared to defend themselves,
the almost forgotten "Rhea letter" reentered the picture.

In the course

of the renewed discussion over Jackson's authorization to seize the
Spanish posts, the veteran Tennessean claimed that he had received the de
sired acquiescence from the President through the medium of John

Rhea.

Jackson insisted that the letter had been received while he was on the
march to Florida and had been duly burned on April 12, 1819, upon the re
quest of Monroe given through Rhea.^^
denied having sent such approval.

When questioned by Calhoun, Monroe

Although Monroe was aged and feeble,

his memory was apparently clear.
John Rhea now found himself in a position that was highly impor-

^^Bassett, Life of Jackson, p. 509.
^3parton, Jacks on, III, 333•
^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 140-41.
^5parton, Jackson, II, 435*
^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 232-35.
^"^Arthur Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats; James Monroe and
the Virginia Dynasty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945),
p. 352.
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tant and, at the same time, unenviable.
fame had rested on two pillars.

Previously, Rhea's moderate

He was deemed an "intimate and confi-

68
dential friend of General Jackson."

And, while serving almost continu

ously from 1802 to 1823 as a typically Republican representative from
Tennessee, he had been able to boast that "he had not been absent from
69
the House a single day."
Rhea's maneuvers in 1831 did not enhance his fame.

Although he

was anxious to help his old friend, he was unable to recall the full
particulars of his role in 1818.

He wrote at least three letters to

Jackson before he was able to recall all that the general desired, and
70
he did not succeed "till he received some important promptings."'

The

first of these letters from Rhea to Jackson was written on January
1831, and read in part:

"I desire to have something to bring matters

fully to my recollection, for at that time (January, 1818) I was. . .
occupied with the business before the committee on pensions and revolu
tionary claims."

In the same letter Rhea added defensively:

^»Say

nothing of me in this business until I speak out as fully as I can, and
therefore this letter is so far confidential, CONFIDENTIAL."'^^

As might

be expected, later writers were to make an issue of Rhea's hesitation.
On June 3, 1831, the second "Rhea letter" was finally written.
While the first one of January, 1818, has never been found, this letter

68
Parton, Jackson, II, 436.
^^Marguerite B. Hamer, "John Rhea of Tennessee," East Tennessee
Historical Society Publications, No. 4 (January, 1932), 38.
7®Bassett, Life of Jackson, p. 248.
"^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 221-22.
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has been kept for posterity.

Rhea began by protesting his loyalty to

Monroe, but insisted that the ex-President must have been affected by a
lapse of memory.

Rhea implored, "you did receive that letter from

Andrew Jackson and you will so write to me. . .you did cojnmunicate con
fident iatlly to me, you approved of the opinions of Andrew Jackson by
him so stated in the Confidential letter and did authorize me to write
to him.
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I did accordingly write to him."

This letter could not be left without making a suitable answer.
While Monroe was incapacitated at the time of its receipt, his ad
visers deemed it necessary to acquaint him with its contents.

When

confronted with Rhea's accusation, Monroe wrote:
It is utterly unfounded and untrue that I ever authorized
John Rhea to write any letter whatever to General Jackson,
authorizing or encouraging him to disobey, or deviate from the
orders which had been communicated to him from the Department of
War. It is utterly unfounded and untrue that I ever desired the
said John Rhea to request General Jackson to destroy any letter
written by him, the said John Rhea, to General Jackson nor did I
at any time wish or desire that any letter, document, or memoran
dum, in the possession of General Jackson or any other person,
relating to xny official conduct, in respect of the Seminole War,
or any other public matter, should be destroyed.73
Despite its obvious importance, this statement by Monroe, signed
on June 19, 1831, was not made public.

Jackson himself did not know

definitely of the declaration until several years later, although he had
been told that the ex-President had strongly denied Rhea's allegations.'^^
The aged statesman died soon after and the matter was not brought

"^^amer. East Tennessee Historical Society Publications. No. 4,
p. 43.
"^^amilton. Writings of Monroe. VII, 230.
^Aschouler, "The Jackson and Van Buren Papers," Atlantic Monthly
XCV (February, 1905), 220-25.
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up again, probably because the quarrel that had precipitated this corres
pondence vias lessening.

Rhea also died shortly after the denial.

Ihe

use of the first "Rhea letter" in justifying Jackson's Florida adventure
has since been debated by a number of biographers and historians.
With this historical background in mind, it remains to be seen
exactly what the views of contemporaries and historians have been con
cerning the matter.
in 1818?

Was Jackson justified in seizing the Spanish posts

If so, on what grounds may the action be defended?

Did the

first "Rhea letter" give Jackson that "green light" which he had sought
in his letter of January 6, 1818?

Was the "Rhea letter" ever actually

written or was it manufactured later for political purposes?

The views

of major contemporaries on these questions will be stated in the next
chapter -

CHAPTER II
CONTMPORARI VIEV»POINTS

When General Jackson seized the Spanish posts of St. Marks and
Pensacola, he aroused considerable interest throughout the country.

The

interest was especially intense in the nation's capital, where the lead
ing figures of the day debated the issue.

Jackson's admirers insisted

that the old hero was justified in his movements while his enemies were
equally vehement in indicting him.

Several widely differing viewpoints,

pro and con, were e35)ounded by the major contemporaries.

These opinions

were influenced by political and personal factors, of course.
The views of the contemporaries have had a profound effect on
later writings.

It should be understood that historians have used these

contemporary discussions extensively in formulating their own analyses
of the affair.

In addition, these critics have been influenced by their

personal opinions of the leading players in the Florida drama.

Conse

quently, the following pages will present not only the views of the major
contemporaries on the justification of Jackson and on the existence of
the "Rhea letter," but also brief character sketches of the principal
participants.
Jackson himself strongly believed that his actions in Florida were
completely justified.

But, as the editor of Blackwood's Edinburgh Maga

zine wrote some years later, the Tennessean "appears to have had the
faculty of believing exactly what he wished to believe, not in the
ordinary limits, but to the extent of being actually possessed by a
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thorough conviction."^

Similarly an eminent twentieth century historian

has written that "there was little to set him apart from the rest, ex
cept a passionate idiosyncracy, a conviction that he was always right,
which, enforced by an imaginative temperament and a fierce will, trans
formed him into the most generous of friends and the most remorseless of
enemies."^

And Jackson's most judicious biographer has even added:

"There is no record that Jackson ever changed an opinion once formed,
whatever the proof offered to him,"^
The complexity of Jackson's character was further explained by
an historian of the nineteenth century who wrote:

"He was narrow, ignor

ant, violent, unreasonable; he punished his enemies and rewarded his
friends.

But he was, on the other hand—and his worst opponents hardly

4
denied it—chaste, truthful, and sincere."

Other historians have also

illustrated the widely differing views of the hero in terms that were
equally candid.^

^"President Andrew Jackson" Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XCI
(May, 1862), 661.
2

George Dangerfield, Era of Good Feeling (New York:
Brace, and Co., 1952), p. 123.

Harcourt,

3
John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 463.

The

^Thomas W. Higginson, "Old Hickory," Harpers, LXIX (July, 1884),
275.
^For example, James Parton, after a year of research on Jackson,
made the following comment: "Andrew Jackson, I am given to understand,
was a patriot and a traitor. He was one of the greatest of generals,
and wholly ignorant of the art of war. A writer brilliant, elegant,
eloquent, without being able to compose a correct sentence, or spell
words of four syllables. . .A stickler for discipline, he never hesi
tated to disobey his superior- A democratic autocrat. An urbane savage.
An atrocious saint." Parton, Jackson, I, vii. Similarly Thomas Perkins
Abernethy made this rather frank comment about Jackson and his influence:
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During the crisis, "Old Hickory" himself used several different
grounds in explaining his attack on the Spanish posts.

As previously

noted, Jackson had been instructed to pursue the enemy to the forts, but
to do nothing more without first notifying the War Department.

The gen

eral firmly believed that the misconduct of the Spanish officers had
justified his action.

In a letter to Secretary of War Calhoun on May 5,

1818, he wrote:
The duplicity of the Spanish Commandant of St. Marks, in
professing friendship towards the United States while he was
actually aiding and supplying her savage enemies, throwing open
the gates of his garrison to their free access, appropriating
the King's stores to their use, issuing ammunition and munitions
of war to them, and knowingly purchasing of them property plundered
from the citizens of the United States, is clearly evinced by the
documents accompanying my correspondence."
Jackson went on to strengthen his case by saying:
I trust, therefore, that the measures which have been pur
sued will meet with the approbation of the President of the United
States. They have been adopted in pursuance of your instructions,
under a firm conviction that they alone were calculated to insure
peace and security to the southern frontier of Georgia.'^
This indicated that Jackson felt at the time that the comprehensive
nature of Calhoun's orders of December 26, 1817, had covered the situa
tion.
Later, on May 29, 1818, the general issued a proclamation to his
troops in which he affirmed his stand:
"No historian has ever accused Jackson the great Democrat, of having had
political philosophy- It is hard to see that he even had any political
principles. He was a man of action, and the man of action is likely to
be an opportunist. Politically speaking, Jackson was certainly an oppor
tunist." Abernethy, "Andrew Jackson and the Rise of Southwestern Democ
racy," American Historical Review, XXXIII (October, 1927), 76.
^U. S. Congress, American State Papers, Class I, Foreign Rela
tions (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), IV, 601.
'^Ibid., p. 602.
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The immutable laws of self-defense^ therefore compelled the
American Grovernment to take possession of such parts of Florida
in which the Spanish authority could not be m^aintained. Pensacola
was found in that situation, and will be held until Spain can fur
nish Military jsic^ strength sufficient to enforce existing
treaties.8
Four days hence in an official report to Calhoun, Jackson further based
his position "on the ijnmutable principles of self-defense authorized by
the law of nations and of nature, on the fact that the Spanish officers
had aided and abetted the Indian enemy and thereby became a party in the
hostilities against us. . .

Yet, when informed that Adams was de

fending him on the basis of similar theories expounded by authorities
on international law, Jackson allegedly exploded:
Pufendorfl

D—n Vattell

"D—n GrotiusI

D—n

This is a mere matter between Jim Monroe and

myself.
Also on June 2, 1818, Jackson wrote to Monroe;
I shall be happy to hear from you, in all things, I have
consulted publick good and the safety and security of our Southern
frontier. I have established peace ajnd safety, and hope that the
government will never yield it, should my acts meet your approba
tion it will be a source of great consolation to me, should it be
disapproved, I have this consolation, that I exercised my best
exertions and Judgt., and that sound national policy will dictate
holding possession as long as we are a republick.H
This letter was endorsed in the margin by Monroe, "he hopes that his
conduct will be approved, which shows that he acted on his own respon
sibility."^^

The President, however, neglected to affix the date of

®Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 375*
S. Congress, Annals, p. 622.
^%elen Nicolay, "A Democratic Despot," Century, XCII (August,
1916), 605.
llSassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 378.
^2ibid.
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endorsement to the note.
Thus, we see that Jackson explained his actions on the basis of
1) the comprehensive nature of his orders, 2) the misconduct of the
Spanish officers, 3) the principle of self-defence, and 4) the approval
of the government.

The latter point was negative in essence.

The gen

eral insisted that the administration had actually agreed with his plans
of January 6, 1818, by failing to reject them.
Another vital figure in the Florida affair was President James
Monroe.

Monroe, a Virginia planter, had been educated at Princeton, and

had served briefly in the Revolutionary War.

In addition, he had been a

congressman, governor of his home state, an ambassador to foreign lands,
13
and a cabinet member under his old friend, James Madison.
Monroe's moral stature as a public official has been widely
debated.

An admirer said of him:

"Mr. Monroe has not been estimated at

his full worth in the public opinion of this generation.
truth one of the great men of our history."^

He was in

Thomas Jefferson once

remarked about Monroe that "he was a man whose soul might be turned in
side out without discovering a blemish to the world.A more recent
student of the Monroe era said:

"Monroe was a good man.

were not lofty, but they were pure."^^

His motives

On the other hand, James Parton

^^William P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill:
of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 123-273.

The University

^Joshua Leavitt, "James Monroe and His Administration," Harpers,
XXIX (September, 1864), 462.
^^Higginson,"Era of Good Feeling," Harpers, LXVIII (May, 1884),

937.
Dangerfield. Era of Good Feeling, pp. 96-97-
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saw Monroe as "one of those gentlemen "who are clay in the hands of such
17
a potter as Andre-w Jackson."
Monroe's position was indeed a peculiar one.

It must be remem

bered that the United States -was anxious to acquire East Florida.

Our

government was beginning to question the right of Spain to hold a
colony that it could not control.

Monroe's views on this subject had

been expressed in his message to Congress on January 13, 1818:
For these injuries, especially those proceeding from Amelia
Island, Spain would be responsible if it was not manifest that,
though committed in the latter instance through her territory,
she was utterly unable to prevent them. Her territory, however,
ought not to be made instrumental, through her inability to defend
it, to purposes so injurious to the United States. To a country
over which she fails to maintain authority, and which she permits
to be converted to the annoyance of her neighbors, her jurisdiction
for a time necessarily ceases to exist.1®
This statement, one must remember, was made before General Jackson made
his move against the Spanish garrisons.

Monroe insisted that the United

States had the right to pursue its enemy into Florida on the principle
of self-defence, but he reiterated the fact that Jackson's orders had
19
directed him to respect the authority of the Spanish government. '
That Monroe was aware of the misdeeds of the Spanish officers
was shown in his letter to Madison on July 1, 1818, part of which was
cited in chapter one.

20

Thus, the President recognized the role of the

foreign officials although he did not believe that Jackson had made the

^^parton, Jackson, II, 356.
James D. Richardson (ed.). Messages and Papers of the Presidents
(11 vols.; Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1900),
II, 593.
^^Ibid., II, 600-01.
^^Refer to Chapter I, p. 10.
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case as clear as he might have,^

Monroe -was not willing to condemn the

Spanish government for the misconduct of a few of her representatives.
Yet he believed that if she could not control her officials she should
give up the colonies.
Consequently, as the July cabinet meetings opened, the President's
first thought was to placate Spain by restoring the forts.

He also

wanted a more satisfactory explanation of the activities of his general.
Monroe had desired to annex Florida by legal means, and this idea was
still uppermost in his mind.

On the other hand, the President was well

aware of Jackson's popularity, and apparently was seeking a sound basis
for justifying his behavior.

Yet Monroe's position in the cabinet

meetings was one of opposition to the actions of the old hero, although
he was not as definite in his opinions as were Calhoun and Crawford.
When the decision was made to restore the posts to Spain, it is signif
icant to note that all of the participants in the sessions attempted to
defend the actions of the general.
Adams wrote in his diary:

But as late as July 20, John Quincy

"The President heard with candor and good

humor all that I said, but without any variation from his original opin/

ion, and my draft of a note to Onis, with all its amendments, was finally
22
fixed precisely on the grounds of the President's original sketch."
While eager to appease Spain, Monroe was not prone to punish
Jackson in any way.

The President stated these opinions in a letter to

Pi
Steinlslaus M. Hamilton (ed.). The Writings of James Monroe (7
vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), VI, 53.
^^Charles Francis Adams (ed.). Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (12
vols.; Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1875), IV, 114.
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23

Thomas Jefferson, written on July 22, 1818.

As the months passed, Monroe appeared to mellow towards the hero
of New Orleans.

In his second annual message to Congress on November 16,

1818, he mentioned the aid given by Spanish officials to the Indians as
the reason for the decision of "Old Hickory" to capture the garrisons.
He emphasized tactfully, however, that Jackson's orders to invade Florida
had taken care not to encroach upon the rights of Spain, but that the
presence of Spanish arms in Indian hands justified the general's move.^
In the satme address Monroe stated:

"The commanding general was convinced

that he should fail in his object, that he should in effect accomplish
nothing, if he did not deprive those savages of the resources on which
they had calculated and of the protection on which they had relied in
o<5
making the war.""^^

This indicated that the President was now more in

clined than he had been in July to justify the chieftain, although he
still insisted that the return of the posts to Spain had been the only
course available to the government.
Meanwhile, Monroe had apparently eased his own mind on the
matter when he penned the following lines to Madison on February 7, 1819:
Had Gen. [sic'3 Jackson been ordered to trial, I have no
doubt that the interior of the country would have been much agitated,
if not convulsed, by appeals to sectional interests, by imputations
of subserviency to the views of Ferdinand, of hostility to the
cause of the colonies, etc., nor have I any doubt that Spain,
deriving confidence and courage from these divisions, would have

23Refer to Chapter I, p. 13.
^James Monroe, Monroe's Messages on Florida (Boston:
of the Old South Work, 1902), pp. 73-79.
^^Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, 611,
^^Ibid., II, 612.
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found new cause to persevere in her procrastination and equivocat
ing policy. . . .If a general in executing orders in a campaign
against an enemy should not make just discriminations in all in
stances between enemies and others I do not consider him as com
mitting a breach of the Constitution, If the government sets the
affair right in other respects there is no breach, although he is
not punished for his mistake.27
The President thus hinted that politics had played a role in the deci
sion of the cabinet to absolve the general from blame on charges of
violating orders or the Constitution.

He also indicated that the nego

tiations with Spain for the cession of Florida were not going well.
This latter situation had not improved by November 24, 1819,
when Monroe wrote to Madison that the government would have to take
Florida, under the terms of the treaty, of course, if Spain did not
ratify soon.''

This proved his anxiety to add Florida to the United

States.
Yet, in spite of his outward tolerance of the general's deeds,
Monroe never wavered in his belief that Jackson had transcended his
orders,

A decade later, he wrote to Calhoun on March 16, 1828:

The Seminoles alone were mentioned, and the war with them
Yiould have been as much terminated by driving them into the Spanish
posts, as by taking the posts, unless Spain, by justifying the
shelter thus afforded them, became a party to the war, and, in
which case, it would have assumed a new character, and acquired
a new force. The order given to General Gaines, which was binding
on General Jackson, was adequate to the end, without making such
attack.29
This was written in response to Calhoun's request for information to
help clear up some details concerning the South Carolinian's quarrel

27Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VI, 88,
^^Ibid., VI, 105.
29Ibid.. VII, 158.
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with Crawford over the items discussed in the cabinet meetings of July,

1818.
Two days later, on March 18, 1828, Monroe further stated his
position in a letter to Major Henry Lee.

The former President intimated

that he had never considered Jackson authorized, from the orders given,
to take the Spanish posts.

After the deed was accomplished, and the

general had explained his interpretation of the orders, however, Monroe
backed "Old Hickory."

The Virginian then laid the blame principally on

•50
the Spanish officers for their misconduct.-^
Thus while Monroe now tended to condone the movements of his im
pulsive chieftain, he was at the same time insistent that he considered
the general to have acted on his own responsibility.

With an eye to

diplomacy, the President insisted upon the return of the captured posts
to Spain.

At the same time, Monroe had his thoughts trained on the

sectional repercussions that might have been aroused had he erred in any
phase of the issue.

In the final analysis, the United States acquired

Florida from Spain by treaty, while the old hero remained somewhat
dubious about the faith and trust of his chief executive.
Now the opinions of the individual cabinet members will be con
sidered.

Secretary of Wfe.r John C. Calhoun led the opposition to Jackson.

Calhoun, a South Carolinian, had been a member of the War Hawks, the
group that had urged war against England in 1812.

A Yale-educated

Southern gentleman, Calhoun was destined to become the champion of the
cause of states-rights in this country.
The Secretary, the most recent addition to the cabinet, refused

3Qibid., VII, 165-66.
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to accept the principle of self-defence.

He insisted that Jackson had

violated the Constitution and had brought us dangerously close to war
with Spain.

Adams noted in his diary on July 13, 1818:

"Mr. Calhoun is

extremely dissatisfied with General Jackson's proceedings in Florida;
thinks Jackson's object to produce a war for the sake of commanding an
expedition against Mexico, and that we shall certainly have a Spanish
war."^^

Later Adams wrote:

"Calhoun, the Secretary of War, generally

of sound, judicious, and comprehensive mind, seems in this case to be
personally offended with the idea that Jackson has set at nought the in
structions of the Department.On July 20^^ the New Englander added
that it was Calhoun who principally bore the argument against him.

The

Carolinian insisted that the capture of Pensacola was not necessary upon
principles of self-defense.

Therefore, according to Calhoun, it was both
OJ
an act of war against Spain suid a violation of the Constitution.
But when he finally backed down in the cabinet fight, Calhoun
wrote to Jackson on September 8, 1818, indicating that he had been a
staunch supporter of the general.

The South Carolinian said that he, as

well as every other member of the administration, had agreed with Jackson
that Florida was important to the security of the Southern frontier.
In addition, Monroe's letter to Jackson on October 20, 1818, indicated

^^C, F. Adams, Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV, 107.
^^Ibid., IV, 108.
^^Calhoun had also hinted that Jackson was involved in land specu
lation in Florida, but this charge was never proved. Ibid.. IV, 115.
3^Ibid.. IV, 113.
^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 393*
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that Calhoun had "just and liberal sentiments on the subject.There
fore, the general was certain that the South Carolinian had been his
friend during the cabinet proceedings.

It is no wonder that Jackson was

surprised and angered when informed several years later of the Secretary's
exact role.

When confronted with the Tennessean's demands for an explana

tion of the position he had taken in 1818, Calhoun responded on May 27,

1830:
The questions involved were numerous and important: whether
you had transcended your orders; if so, what course ought to be
adopted; what was the state of our relations with Spain, suid,
through her, with the other European powers; a question, at the
time, of uncommon complication and difficulty. These questions had
all to be carefully examined and weighed, both separately and in
connection, before a final opinion could be wisely formed; and
never did I see a deliberation in which every point was more care
fully examined, or a greater solicitude displayed to arrive at a
correct decision. I was the junior member of the cabinet and had
been but a few months in the administration. As Sec. [sic3 of
War, I was more immediately connected with the questions whether
you had transcended your orders, and, if so, what course ought to be
pursued. I was of the impression that you exceeded your orders,
and had acted on your own responsibility; but I neither questioned
your patriotism nor your motives. Believing that where orders were
transcended, investigation as a matter of course, ought to follow,
as due in justice to the government and the officer, unless there
be strong reasons to the contrary, I came to the meeting under the
impression that the usual course ought to be pursued in this case,
which I supported by presenting fully and freely all the arguments
that occurred to me.37
One must remember that in 1830 Jackson was putting the pressure on his
Vice-President in order to discredit him completely.
fighting for his political life.
could break him if he so desired.

Calhoun was now

The Carolinian knew that the President
Jackson might have admired Calhoun to

some extent if he had stated his position more positively.

This, however.

^^Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VI, 75^"^Richard K. Cralle (ed.). The Works of John C. Calhoun (6 vols.;
New York: D. Applet on and Co., 1856-1857), VI, 371.
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marked the termination of the speaking relationship between the two men.
Next the attitude of Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford
must be considered.

The Virginia-born Crawford had been an enemy of

Jackson since he had opposed the general's Indian policy under the Treaty
of Fort Jackson.Therefore, it was easy for Jackson to assume that
Crawford had been his chief enemy in the cabinet.

The Georgian, a per

sonable man who appealed to a large segment of the population, had his
eye on the Presidency.

His road to the White House was blocked mainly

by Calhoun and Jackson.

In 1816 Calhoun, who also had designs on the

Presidential chair, had supported Monroe in opposition to Crawford.

The

South Carolinian had feared the rise of a rival from his own section of
39
the country. ' In 1818 Crawford was Just as fearful of the rising poli
tical possibilities of the general.

At that time Crawford felt that he

would be the rightful successor to Monroe in 1824, so his views in the
cabinet sessions were undoubtedly colored by his desire for the nominatlon.

kO

At the cabinet meetings Crawford said that if the administration
did not immediately declare itself and restore Pensacola, it would be
held responsible for Jackson's having taken it, and for having commenced
41
a war in violation of the Constitution.

According to Adams, however,

3®J. E. D. Shipp, The Giant Days; The Life and T^es of William
H. Crawford (Americus, Georgia; Southern Printers, 1909), p. 150.
39ibid.. p. 152.
^^^Wrgaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun;
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 139-40.
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American Portrait (Boston;

C. F- Adams, Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV, 109.
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Crawford's vievipoints v»ere influenced by factors other than indignation
over an apparent violation of the Constitution.

The New Englander penned

in his diary on January 7> 1818:
It happens, unfortunately, that Crawford's interest and
stimulus of personal ambition, prematurely roused by his having
started as a candidate for the Presidency against Mr, Monroe at
the late election, now pushed him not only to contribute in
running down Jackson as a formidable rival but even to counter
act, as much as is in his power,the general success of the
Administration, and particularly that of the Department of
State.42
Later, during the squabble with Calhoun which began in 1827, Crawford
stated that his views had undergone a material change after the cabinet
meetings had opened.

In a letter to John Forsyth written on April 30,

1830, the Georgian asserted that Jackson's letter of January 6, 1818,
had been brought up during the cabinet sessions.
not previously read it, he now produced it.

Although Monroe had

Crawford indicated that he

felt that the general should be excused because the silence of the
President had meant consent.
proposed punishment.

Then, according to the Georgian, Calhoun

When questioned concerning this, Monroe and every

other member of the cabinet believed that Crawford's memory had deceived
43
him.

Therefore, Crawford's change of attitude between 1818 and 1830

may have been pron^jted by the desire to help crush his old enemy, Calhoun.
Consequently, the defense of Jackson in the cabinet meetings was
borne solely by Adams.

The Secretary of State was the son of the

ex-President, and a Bostonian not inclined to sentimentality.

The

learned New Englander made this lengthy entry in his diary in July 15,

^^Ibid.« IV, 214.

43parton, Jackson, II, 509-10.
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1818:
The President and all the members of the Cabinet, except
myself, are of the opinion that Jackson acted not only without,
but against his instructions; that he has committed war upon Spain
which cannot be justified, and in which, if not disavowed by the
Administration, they will be abandoned by the country. My opinion
is that there was no real, though an apparent, violation of his
instructions J that his proceedings were justified by the necessity
of the case, and by the misconduct of the Spanish commanding
officers in Florida. The question is embarrassing and complicated,
not only as involving that of an actual war with Spain, but that of
Executive power to authorize hostilities without a declaration of
war by Congress. There is no doubt that defensive acts of hos
tility may be authorized by the Executive; but Jackson was
authorized to cross the Spanish line in pursuit of the Indian
enemy. My argument is that the question of the constitutional
authority of the executive is precisely there; that all the rest,
even to the order for taking the Fort of Barrancas by storm, was
incidental, deriving its character from the object, which was not
hostility to Spain, but the termination of the Indian war. This
is the justification alleged by Jackson himself, but he also
alleges that an imaginary line of the thirty-first degree of
latitude could not afford protection to our frontiers while the
Indians could have a safe refuge in Florida, and that all his
operations were founded on that consideration.^
Adams' viewpoints had apparently been formed from the beginning, for the
week before the meetings commenced he had signified to Monroe that he
justified Jackson's actions in view of the necessity of the situation and
by the misconduct of the Spanish officers.^^

On July 20 the Puritan made

the following entry:
Looking over General Jackson's letters, it struck me there
was a new point of view in which his conduct in taking Pensacola
was defensible, and at the Cabinet meeting I presented it again,
and argued it with all the force I could. It appeared to make
some impression upon Mr, Wirt, but the President and Mr- Calhoun
were inflexible.
My reasoning was that Jackson took Pensacola only because
the Gkjvernor threatened to drive him out of the province by force
if he did not withdraw; that Jackson was only executing his orders

^^C. F. Adams, Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV, 108.
^^worthington C. Ford (ed.). The Writings of John Quincy Adams
(7 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913-1917), VI, 384.
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when he received this threat; that he could not withdraw his troops
from the province consistently with his orders, and that his only
alternative mas to prevent the execution of the threat
Adams thus insisted that Jackson should have been defended because the
general's attack on Pensacola was made only after the Spanish commandant,
Jose Masot, had threatened to

use force to evict the American troops.

The Spanish representative in Washington admitted, on July 11, 1818,
that the Pensacola governor had acted without being thoroughly aviare of
Jackson's intentions

This hedging on the part of Onis was enough of

an opening for Adams and the rest of the supporters of Jackson.

The

Secretary of State went on to say:
I insisted that the character of Jackson's measures was de
cided by the intention with which they were taken, which was not
hostility to Spain, but self-defence against the hostility of
Spanish officers. I admitted that it was necessary to carry the
reasoning upon my principles to the utmost extent it would bear
to come to this conclusion.^®
Later, of course, Jackson turned against his only defender after the
political campaign of 1824-^^
Attorney-General William H. Wirt was apparently only an interested
auditor during the Cabinet meetings.

There is little evidence, even in

the comprehensive Adams diary, that he said anything except when queried
on a point of constitutional law.

From what has been cited before.

F. Adams, Memoirs of J. Q. Adams. IV, 113.
^"^Adams wrote on this date: "Mr. Onis, the Spanish Minister,
called on me at my house to talk of the negotiation. He was more
tractable on the subject of Pensacola; said General Jackson had mis
understood Governor Masot's allusion to force; that he had only meant
to say that if Jackson attacked him he would repel force by force."
Ibid., IV, 106.
48Ibid., IV, 113.
^^James Truslow Adams, The Adams Family (New York:
Guild, 1930), p. 172.
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however, we know that he sided with the anti-Jackson faction, although
he was not as decided in opinions as were Calhoun and the President.
The views of ex—Presidents Jefferson and Madison should also be
examined briefly.

In a letter written to Albert Gallatin on November 18,

1818, Jefferson stated:
In the first moment, indeed there was a general outcry of
condemnation of what appeared to be a wrongful aggression. But
this was quieted at once by information that it (Pensacola) had
been taken without orders and would be instantly restored; and
although done without orders, yet not without justifiable cause,
as we are assured will be satisfactorily shown.50
Jefferson thus recognized the possible justification of the general.
Later, on March 3, 1819, he wrote to Madison that he had never doubted
the justification of the temporary occupation of the Spanish posts.
Madison expressed himself in a note to Monroe on February 13, 1819:
It would be a happiness also, if the subject as it relates
to Gen. (sic3 Jackson could have an issue satisfactory to his
feelings and to the scruples of his friends and admirers. MrAdams has given all its lustre to the proof that the conduct of
the Gen. [sic3 is invulnerable to complaints from abroad: and
the question between him and his Country ought to be judged under
the persuasion that if he has erred it was in the zeal of his
patriotism, and under a recollection of the great services he
has rendered.52
The cabinet members were not the only ones interested in the
matter.

The floor of the House of Representatives provided a fertile

ground for the major portion of the oratory on the Seminole proceedings.
As has been previously noted, the resolutions censuring the old hero
were defeated in the House, but some rather significant viewpoints were
5^aul Leicester Ford (ed.). The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
(10 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), X, 115.
^^Ibid., X, 124-25.
^^Gaillard Hunt (ed.). The Writings of James Madison (9 vols.;
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908), VIII, 421.
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expressed by congressmen during this lengthy debate.

The arguments,

pro and con, will be considered separately.
To begin with, on January 12, 1819, the House Committee on Mili
tary Affairs, under the chairmanship of Thomas M. Nelson (Va.), resolved
that the proceedings in Florida be condemned by the House as a whole as
a violation of the Constitution.^^

It is significant to note again,

however, that the minority of the Committee, headed by Richard M.
Johnson of Kentucky, had asserted that the general should have been
given a vote of thanks rather than a threat of censure.
Meanwhile, Henry Clay of Kentucky led the attack on Jackson in
the House,

The erstwhile War Hawk insisted that he had no personal

feeling against the general.

On the contrary, he was sincerely and

profoundly grateful to the man who had preserved American honor during
the War of 1812.

But, Clay averred, as a friend of the Constitution,

he coiiLd not possibly approve Jackson's lawless conduct in Florida.
The Kentuckian warned against defending Jackson on the basis of his
reputation:
Are former services, however, eminent, to preclude even
inquiry into recent conduct? Is there to be no limit, no pru
dential bounds to the national gratitude? I hope gentlemen will
deliberately survey the awful isthmus on which we stand. They
may bear down all opposition; they may even vote the general
the public thanks; they may carry him triumphantly through this
House. But if they do so, it will be a triumph of the military
over the civil authority, a triumph over the powers of this
House, a triumph over the Constitution of the land. And I pray
most devoutly to Heaven that it may not prove, in its ultimate

53u. S. Congress, Annals. p. 518.
^^Ibid., p. 527.
^^Ibid., pp. 631-32.
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effects and consequences, a triumph over the liberties of the
people.56
Joseph Hopkinson (Pa.) then expressed the common view that Jack
son had overstepped the limits of his authority.

The Pennsylvanian

said that such matters should be handled by the government and not by a
military commander
William Lowndes (S. C.), who at the time was living with the
Calhouns at Dumbarton Oaks and was closely linked politically with his
fellow-South Carolinian, emphasized this same point, and went on to
explain the reasons for Jackson's action.

Considering it clear that

there was no military necessity for the occupation of St. Marks sind
Pensacola, the brilliant Carolinian believed that "Old Hickory's" moves
were political in nature.

He asserted that the general's correspondence

corroborated this statement.

58

Yet it is significant to note that one

year later when Spain was still delaying the ratification of the Florida
treaty, Lowndes, speaking for the Committee on Foreign Relations,
59
recommended that Florida be occupied as an indemnity for spoliations.^'

John Tyler (Va.) based his address primarily on the wrong done
to the land.

Early in his speech he remarkeds

Spain; her wrongs are ntimerous and great.

"I am no apologist for

But, I will never cease to

protest against this violation of the Constitution."^^

Later, the

^^Ibid.. p. 655.
^'^Ibid., p. 875.
5%. S. Congress, Annals, pp. 91$-19.
^^Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (3 vols,; Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944-1951I> 210.
S. Congress, Annals, p. 929.
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Virginian expressed a thought quite prevalent in these anti-Jackson
orations:

"Oh, no, sir, I for one, feel no enmity toward him; I sun an

enemy of no man, but I trust I am a friend to the Constitution and the
law."^^

Although Tyler in 1833 joined the Whigs who were formed in

opposition to "King Andrew I,"" his split with the general was not com
pleted until Jackson's stands on nullification and the Bank had antagonized him.

According to his biographer, there was no evidence that

Tyler opposed Jackson in 1819 on any ground other than a sincere convic
tion that the general had erred.
Representative William Fuller (Mass.) attacked the defense that
Jackson's orders were comprehensive enough to cover his movements.

He

stated;
Suppose, then,the order was broad enough to warrant him in
marching to Florida, and attacking the Indians, without regarding
the conditions to which General Jackson had been restricted; in
other words, without the necessity of pursuing invaders or
punishing depredation. This is conceding much to a liberal con
struction of the General's military power
Fuller was referring to political factors later when he said, "let me
earnestly entreat gentlemen to discard from their bosoms such considerations-to forget that the 'hero of New Orleans' is the officer con
cerned."^^
Another military man, William Henry Harrison (Ohio), believed

^^Ibid., p. 934.
^^Oliver Perry Chitwood, John Tyler (New York:
Century Co., 1939), pp. 112-13.
^3ibid., pp. 39-40.
S. Congress, Annals, p. 992.
^^Ibid.. p. 1006.
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that Jackson had erred honestly, but:
His conduct, in relation to the Spanish posts, -was un
authorized by the President; that the President considered it an
unconstitutional act is evident from his having agreed to restore
them to Spain without the authority of a law of Congress. If
these posts were a legal acquisition to the arms of the United
States, the President could no more surrender them by his own
authority than we could restore to Britain the frigate, Macedonian,
or amy other capture made during the war.^^
Others who spoke against Jackson were Thomas M. Nelson, Charles
F. Mercer, and Edward Colston (Va.), Thomas Cobb (Ga.)> Henry R. Storrs
(N. Y.), Philip Reed (Md.)> and Thomas S. Williams (Conn.)-

Cobb, in

particular, did not believe that Jackson should have been defended on
the basis of the international law of self-defense.

The others based

their argument mainly on Jackson's transcending of orders and his consequent violation of the Constitution.
It is significant to note that of the men who spoke out against
Jackson, several were destined to continue to oppose him throughout his
political career-

Clay and Harrison became prominent leaders of the

Whigs, and Tyler also joined that party after his break with Jackson in
1833.

Lowndes was a close friend of Calhoun, and Cobb was allied with

Crawford.

Of the others, Hopkinson, Storrs, and Colston were ex-

Federalists who were unsympathetic with the liberal beliefs of the old
hero,

while the remainder were Democrats, whose views might have been

influenced partially by personal convictions.^^
66lbid.. p. 1031.
67ibid.> pp.

.

^^Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927
(Washington; United States Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 111314, 1577, 835.
^^Ibid., pp. 993, 1352-53, 1505, 1450, 1708.
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On the other hand, George Poindexter of Mississippi, who made per
haps the best defense of Jackson in the House, first of all questioned
the right of that body to even attempt to censure Jackson.

He reasoned

that Jackson had been ordered by the President to enter the territory
of Florida.

Therefore, the Chief Executive should have accepted the

70
responsibility for the actions of his general.'

The Mississippian later

went on to blame Spain for Jackson's present woes;
Yes, sir, the territory of Florida is emphatically a country
'open to all comers I• The British found a hearty welcome there
during the late war. The outlawed Creeks received the right hand
of fellowship from Governor Masot, and his retinue of official
dignitaries; fugitive negroes and banditti are welcome guests, when
associated in arms against the United States; and I am persuaded the
devil himself would have received Holy orders, had he made his
appearance at Pensacola in the character of a foe of this countryWe alone were excluded from the high privilege of meeting our
enemies on that soil which was prostituted to every purpose which
could in any manner subserve their views, and contribute to our
annoyance.Vl
The position of Congressman John Rhea (Tenn.) must also be con
sidered.

The man who was destined to play a greater role in this affair

in I83O-I83I stated:
General Jackson was authorized by the supreme law of nature
and nations, the law of self-defence, corresponding with the great
national maxim, namely, the safety of the people is the supreme
law, to enter the Spanish territory of Florida in pursuit of, and
to destroy, hostile, murdering savages, not bound by any obliga
tion, who were without the practice of any moral principle
reciprocally obligatory on nations.72
The testimony of James Tallmadge of New York indicated that men
who were not from the Southwest also supported the general.

S. Congress, Annals, p. 961.
'^^Ibid., p. 964•
'^^Ibid., p. 867-

Also see p. 870.
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Yorker averred that the discretionary nature of his orders fully justi
fied Jackson.In addition, Lemuel Sawyer (N. Y.) justified Jackson
by "one law at least, the force of which all are ready to admit—selfpreservation."'^^

David Walker (Ky.) also made this rather startling

c omment:
If Gen. Jackson had returned from the Florida line, is
there a woman in Georgia, or a child in Alabama, that does not
know that Arbuthnot and Ambrister would have excited their
myrmidons to the repetition of those deeds, at the thought of
which the blood curdles and runs cold with horror?'75
Others who defended Jackson primarily on the principle of selfdefense and on the comprehensive nature of his orders were John Holmes
(Mass.), Richard C. Anderson, Jr., and Joseph Desha (Ky.), Alexander
Smyth, Philip Barbour, George F. Strother, Hu^ Nelson, and John Floyd
(Va.), Felix. Walker (N. G.), Francis Jones (Tenn.), Henry Baldwin (Pa.),
and James Ervin (S. C.).
Ervin summed up the feelings of the pro-Jacksonians in the last
speech of the debate:
Most unfortunate of unfortunate menI If he does not march
into Florida, he disobeys the orders of his superiors, and his
coirmission or his life may be forfeit. If he does, and encounters
difficulties, dangers, and almost starvation itself, in an honest
endeavor to promote the interest and glory of his country, he
meets the frowns of the representatives of the very people whom
he has been endeavoring to benefit."^"
A few facts concerning the supporters of Jackson appear to be
worthy of note.

Richard M. Johnson, who had opposed the resolution as

'^^ibid.« p. 717.
"^^Ibid., p. 783.
'^^Ibid.. p. 1008.
lbid., p. 1132.
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a member of the Military Affairs Committee, was handpicked by "Old
Hickory" as Van Buren's running mate in 1836.'^'^

James Ervin of South

Carolina vsas a protectionist, and therefore in natural opposition to
Calhoun.'^®

Barbour of Virginia and Baldwin of Pennsylvania were ap

pointed by Jackson in 1830 to a federal judgeship and to the Supreme
Court, respectively.

The former was also later named by Jackson as an

associate justice of the Supreme Court.

This selection was confirmed by

79
the Senate in 1836' Strother of Virginia became receiver of public

moneys in St. Louis in 1820, a position which he held until 1840.

This

fact was remarkable in view of the spoils system of the Jacksonian
era.80

Most of the other supporters were southwestern Democrats who

were sympathetic with the procedures against Spain.
With the speeches concluded, the House proceeded to bring the
affairs to a close.

The resolution that the seizure of the Spanish

posts was contrary to the Constitution of the United States was again

81
placed before the House.

In its subsequent votijig the House rejected

the resolution by a margin of one hundred to seventy, thereby upholding
the actions of the general.®^

Meanwhile, the acquittal in the House

greatly increased Jackson's popularity, and soon he was involved in

'^'^Marquis Jsunes, Andrew Jackson, Portrait of a President (Indian
apolis; The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1937), P» 414*
'^^Biography of American Congress, p. 948.
79ibid., pp. 669, 665.
QQibid., p. 1582.
S. Congress, Annals, p. II38.
®^Ibid.
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politics.®^

After serving a short time as Governor of Florida in 1821,

he 7»as sent to the Senate in 1823-

After being defeated by Adams in the

controversial election of 1824, he was successful in winning his way
to the VJhite House four years later.

Calhoun was his Vice-President.

As previously noted, the political quarrels between Calhoun and Crawford,
and later between Calhoun and Van Buren, revived the positions of the
members of the Monroe Cabinet on the Seminole affair.

Finally aware in

May, 1830, of the exact role of Calhoun in the matter, the President
attempted to strengthen his own position by releasing his statement
that the desired secret authorization had been received from Monroe
through Rhea.

Jackson asserted that while on his way to Fort Scott,

in February, 1818, he received from Rhea the expected assurance, and
that it was in consequence of that information that he had carried his
army boldly into Florida.

He also asserted that he had preserved Rhea's

letter until the Seminole controversy of the succeeding winter became
warm.

Then, on April 12, 1819, he had burned the letter at the request

of Rhea, who said that he urged it at Monroe's solicitation.®^
Before the viewpoints of the contemporaries on the existence of
the "Rhea letter" have been examined, some facets concerning this
strange episode should be listed.

These possibilities all have arisen

in the testimony given in 1831 and later:

1) that the letter was a

political invention by the Jacksonians to discredit Calhoun: 2) that
it was an outright fabrication by Rhea; 3) that it was actually written
through Rhea's misunderstanding of some remark made by Monroe; 1+) that

®^Bassett, Life of Jackson, p. 287®^Ibid., pp. 246-47 -
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there -was falsehood by either Jackson or Monroe; 5) that there was a
failure of memory by either Jackson or Monroe; 6) that Jackson misunder
stood remarks by Rhea which referred to another matter (the channeling
through Jackson of all War Department orders to subordinates); or 7)
that Jackson merely interpreted Rhea's letter of January 12, 1818, in
the light of his own desires.

Now, beginning with Jackson, the cases

of the principal characters will be presented.
Jackson's story, which has already been presented in part, has
been best set forth during the preparation of an exposition against
Calhoun in February, 1831.

The general proclaimed:

I received the answer to my confidential letter of the
6 January, 1818, from Monroe, through J. Rhea, on my way to Fort
Scott, after I left Hartford, Georgia. It may be proper to re
mark that, when I wrote my confidential letter to Mr. Monroe, I
had no idea that I would be ordered to Florida.
Concerning the disposition of the letter, "Old Hickory" went on to
say:
When I arrived in the City Mr~ Calhoun and Mr. Monroe treated
me with great apparent politeness, and after the vote in the House,
and about the adjournment of Congress, Mr. Rhea came to my lodgings
from the President's, and asked me if I had received his confidential
letter in reply to mine to Monroe on the 6th day of Jsuiuary, 1818.
I told him that I had received it on my march to Fort Scott. He
then asked me where it was, and I replied that it was with my con
fidential letters safely locked up at home, Mr, Rhea then said to
me I have waited upon you, with the request of Mr, Monroe, to which
I add my own as a friend and brother Mason, that you would burn it.
Having full confidence in the friendship of Mr~ Monroe and MrRhea, and not fearing but that if it became necessary its contents
would be admitted, and the House of Representatives having, by a
large majority, approved my conduct, and it being suggested by MrRhea that Mr. Monroe was fearful, ay health being delicate, that
the letter would fall into the hands of my executors, I yielded to
the request, and promised that on my return home I would burn it.
Accordingly on the 12th of April, 1819, in the presence of MrSaml. Overton, I did burn it, and made a memorandum of the fact
on the margin of my letter book, opposite to that part of the

^^Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson« IV, 232.
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letter which alluded to Mr. Rhea.®^
To those who accepted Jackson's word as gospel, this statement
was enough to document the existence of the "Rhea letter."
however, Monroe did not corroborate the story.

Unfortunately,

As early as December 28,

1827, in a letter to Calhoun, Monroe had established his position;
The circumstances attending the letter alluding to an under
standing with Mr. Rhea, I presume you will recollect. I never read
it until after the affair was concluded, nor did I afterwards think
of it until you recalled it to my recollections, by an intimation
of its contents, and a suggestion that it had also been read by
Mr- Crawford, who had mentioned it to some persons who might be
disposed to turn it over to some account of that period. . . .1
asked Mr. Rhea, in a general conversation whether he had ever in
timated to General Jackson his opinion that the Administration had
no objection to his making an attack on Pensacola, and he declared
that he never had. I did not know if the Gen. |^icZ} had written
to him to the same effect that he had to me, as I had not read
his letter- . . .that he might have led me innocently into a
conversation in which, wishing to obtain Florida, I might have
expressed a sentiment from which he might have drawn that infer
ence. But he assured me that no such conversation ever passed
between us. I did not apprize him of the letter which I had re
ceived from the Gen. [sic"^ on the subject, being able to ascer
tain my object without doing it.®?
This statement would seem to disprove the "Rhea letter" theory, but the
political controversy of 1830-1831 brought further requests for added
proof from Monroe. He was unwilling to speak out in the Calhoun-Crawford
dispute, but he was insistent that he was right on the "Rhea letter"
incident.

In February of 1831., he wrote again to Calhoun:

I mention this in strict confidence, the defect of my memory
alone is a strong argument against my statement of anything rela
tive to the conduct of the individual members, further than what
relates to the letter of Gen. |sic7| Jackson, which stands on its
own peculiar ground, and asserts what was not done and to which,
had it been done, being a party, as was asserted, I could not have
forgotten
06lbid., IV, 235.
O'^Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VII, 139.
^^Ibid.. VII, 226.
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However, Monroe appeared to hedge in a note to Adams on March 11,
1831:
Jackson especially requested in it an informal sanction from
Gten. (sic3 Rhea and without which, in the spirit of the letter,
none could be inferred. Besides what is the fair import of the
letter? He does not ask an official authority from me. He asks
only my consent as an individual and evidently with an intention
not to compromit [sic^ nie, even in that character- The letter,
therefore, had it been answered, and the sanction been given, was
an affair of confidence between him and me, never to be disclosed.
On what principle it can be relied on as an authority to attack
the posts, and to make me responsible for it, I cannot c o n c e i v e .
The second "Rhea letter" of June 3# 1831, and the subsequent
denunciation by Monroe have been covered.
After the death of the Virginian, his son-in-law and secretary,
Samuel L. Gouverneur of New York, published a statement denying that
Monroe had ever authorized Rhea to answer Jackson.
part:

Gouverneur said in

"There is no shape in which the facts alluded to has ever reached

the eye or ear of Mr, Monroe that it has not been contradicted.

It is
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as his representative and upon his authority that I contradict it."'
One must remember, however, that while Monroe and Gouverneur
issued positive statements of denial, Jackson was just as definite in his
affirmation of the existence of the secret authorization.

In addition,

the Tennessean was supported by John Rhea, Judge John Overton, and the
redoubtable Major Henry Lee.
The statements of these three men must also be considered.
behavior of Rhea in respect to the dispute was certainly peculiar.

The
After

Q9ibid,. VII, 228.
^^Refer to Chapter I, pp. 22-23.
^^Parton, Jackson,, II, 528-29. This statement was found in the
New York Courier and Enquirer, October 1, 1832,
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the opening of the hearings in Congress, Rhea wrote to Jackson on
December 18, 1818:

"I will for one support your conduct, believing

as far as I have read that you acted for public good.

This might

lead the reader to believe that Rhea knew nothing of the "Rhea letter.«
Later Rhea was willing to support his old friend, Gteneral Jack
son, but was unable to remember the particulars in the case.

His

letters to the chieftain on January 4* 1831,^^ and March 30, 1831^^^
requested help in recalling the facts.

Finally, his positive assertion

of the existence of the controversial letter led to Monroe's equally
positive denial on June 19, 1831.^^
Judge Overton, a long-time friend of Jackson, also supported
the general's assertion, but in a manner equally vague.

On June 2,

1831, the same day that Jackson gave full particulars to Rhea, Overton
wrote to the general;
I recollect when writing the pamphlet defence of the
Executive and his commanding Gen. jsic^ in relation to the
Seminole War, in 1818, that upon the requesting from you, minute
information, on every point connected with the campaign, that you
furnished me with your orders etc., and placed before me your
confidential letter to Mr. Monroe, being a copy of one trans
mitted, to him as you stated, with Mr. John Rhea's letter in his
handwriting, which, in substance conveyed the idea, that he had
conversed with the President, who showed him your confidential
letter; that he approved of your suggestions, etc.9°
When Jackson requested information from Major Henry Lee, who was

92Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 404.
93ibid.. IV, 221-22.
9^Ibid., IV, 254-55.

95Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, VII, 230.
96Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 287-88.
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on a mission to Paris, he received the following reply in September,
1832:

"My answer to this inquiry is that I have a distinct recollec-

tion. . . .that you burnt the letter. ..."97
On the other hand, the members of the Monroe cabinet had little
to state about the existence of the "Rhea letter,"

Calhoun and Crawford

virtually had nothing to say about it, but the loquacious Adams had a
very definite viewpoint.

In a lengthy entry in his diary on August 30,

1831, the New Englander averred:
Jackson's excessive anxiety to rest the justification of
his invasion of Florida upon a secret, collusive, and unconstitu
tional correspondence with Mr. Monroe can be explained only by an
effort to quiet the stings of his conscience for the baseness of
his ingratitude to me. Writhing under the consciousness of the
return which he has made to me for saving him from public indigna
tion and defending him triumphantly against the vengeance of
Britain and Spain, the impeachment of Congress, the disavowal of
Mr- Monroe and the Court-martial of Calhoun and Crawford, he
struggles to bring his cause before the world and before posterity
upon another basis. This basis is itself as rotten as his own
heart. It is, that his conquest of Florida was undertaken and
accomplished, not, as I had successfully contended for him, upon
principles warranted by the law of nations and consistent with
the Constitution of the United States, but by a secret fraudulent
concert between him and Mr. Monroe, in direct violation of the
Constitution and of all its conservative principles. To establish
this, he resorts to his own unprincipled letter, which I never
saw; to the recreant desperation of Crawford, and to the ravenous
imbecility of John Rheaj he has succeeded with them both—both
have made themselves, by impudent, unblushing falsehoods, panders
to his unnatural passions; and to glut his revenge upon me, for
benefits such as he never received from any other man, he has been
laboring not only to blast the good name of Monroe, but to cover
with infamy his own. His moral conceptions are so confused and
discomposed by his convulsive passions, that in his eagerness to
throw off his obligations to me and to ruin the reputation of Mr,
Monroe, he blinds himself entirely to the inevitable recoil upon
himself. It is fortunate that Mr, Monroe lived and retained his
faculties to make a solemn and authentic declaration of the total
falsehood of John Rhea's abominable statement,

97lbid,. IV, 472.
^®C, F. Adams, Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, VIII, 404-05.
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The testimony of the major contemporaries has been examined.
it remains to be seen V9hat the biographers and historians have said
after research and reflection on the question.

Now

CHAPTER III

PRE-WORLD WAR I VIEIUPOINTS

Many biographers and historians have examined Jackson's Florida
adventure.

Their interpretations have involved the justification of

the actions of the general as well as the existence of the '"Rhea letter."
This chapter will consider the views of the major writers from the time
of the Seminole campaign until the outbreak of World War I.

It will be

noted that while a few of the authors have dealt with both phases of
the problem, some have mentioned only the aspect of justification, and
still others have merely given attention to the "Rhea letter."

In addi

tion, several writers omitted the controversies completely in their
works.

To begin with, the views of the biographers of Jackson will be

examined.

Then, the opinions of the biographers of those major contem

poraries who played supporting roles will be presented.

And, finally,

the writings of the historians of the era will be considered.
Of the numerous authors of the pre-World War I period who under
took the task of writing a biography of Jackson, very few gave attention
to the Seminole incident.

Actually, the only major work of that era

was by James Parbon, a professional writer who prepared a three-volume
life of the hero of New Orleans.

The other efforts were, in the main,

single-volume biographical sketches.

The brevity of these books un

doubtedly explains in part the failure of the authors to delve deeply
into the details of the life of Jackson.
56

In addition, one must consider
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the fact that Jackson's side of the Florida story was not fully known
until Thomas Hart Benton completed his autobiography in 1854•

At that

time Jackson's "Exposition against Calhoun," actually written in 1831,
was first made public when Benton printed the text of it.^

Nevertheless,

some of the comments of these early writers are woi*thy of mention in
this study.
As early as 1819, S, Putnam Waldo completed a brief memoir of the
general's career.

While the work was finished too soon to include the

congressional reaction to the invasion or, of course, the later dis
cussion over the "Rhea letter," Waldo did comment on the justification
of the hero.

He believed that the defense of the actions of the general

was founded on two basic factors.
Spanish officials.

First, he cited the misconduct of the

Second, he believed that the alleged sheltering of

hostile Indians in Florida presented a constant menace to the frontier
settlers.

Waldo vividly defended the invasion;

The Spanish government had palpably violated their treaty
with America; and if thirteen years more of negotiations were to
be spent, the Alabama Territory, the frontiers of Georgia,
Tennessee, and Mississippi, will have presented a wide spread
scene of desolation, in which the bones of American citizens
would be found mingled with the ruins of their habitations, and
the devastations of the country.2
Additional brief sketches of the general were written by contem
poraries between 1828 and 1845-

Four of these, by Jerome Van Crownin-

•^Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View (2 vols.; New York;
Appleton and Co., 1854-1856), I, I67-8O.
^S. Putnam Waldo, Memoirs of Andrew Jackson (Hartford;
Andrus, 1819)* P» 299•

Silas

D.
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shield Smith (1828),^ William Cobbett (1834),^ Seba Smith (1834),^ and
an anonymous New Yorker (1845)have been examined, but not one of
these writers even mentioned the Seminole controversy.

While this might

seem strange in light of the political struggles of that period, one
must remember that these works were not complete biographies.
After the death of the general in 1845, B. M. Dusenberry edited
some eulogies of the former President with his own comments added.

The

editor mentioned the Seminole affair briefly, but did not express an
. .
7
opinion.
A year later, John Frost, in a pictorial study of "Old Hickory,"
defended Jackson on the basis of the comprehensive nature of his orders
from Calhoun.

Referring to the encampment at Fort Scott, Frost wrote:

"Here he received a letter from the secretary of war, dated February 6th,
informing him of the entire approbation of the president of all the
measures he had adopted to terminate the war- ..."

The author be

lieved that Jackson had considered this to be an approval of his clandestine proposal of Janioary 6, 1818.

^Jerome Van Crowninshield Smith, Memoirs of Andrew Jackson (Boston:
Charles Ewer, 1828).
Sfilliam Cobbett, Life of Andrew Jackson (New York;
Bros., 1834)-

Harper &

^Seba Smith, The Life of Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia:
Greenbank, 1834)•

T. K.

^A Citizen of Western New York, Memoirs of General Andrew Jackson
(Auburn: James C. Derby and Co., 1845)'^B. M. Dusenberry (ed.). Monument to the Memory of General Andrew
Jackson (Nashua: Charles T. McGill, 1846), p. 75•
®John Frost, Pictorial Life of Andrew Jackson (Hartford:
and Hamersley, 1847), p. 440.

Belknap
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It was in I85O that the next biography of the general appeared.
John S, Jenkins, in a brief volume, defended Jackson's action on the
ground of self-defense.

He stated that there was certainly a necessity

for crossing the line, and that the weakness of the Spanish authorities
in failing to restrain the renegade Indians and Negroes justified the
Q
bold movements of the Tennessean.
After saying that the Jsuiuary 6, 1818,
missive had been written at the Hermitage, this writer made no further
mention of the "Rhea letter," howeverAs mentioned earlier, Jackson's own story of the affairs of 1818
and I83I was not fully known until 1854.^^

At that time Thomas Hart

Benton published his massive two-volume Thirty Years' View in the United
States Senate.

Benton, a long-time Senator from Missouri had been a

friend, then an enemy, and finally a staunch supporter of the general.
In revealing the Jacksonian side of the story, Benton attempted to
clarify the true place of the general in the history of the era.

He

believed that Jackson had suffered from the flurry of Calhoun eulogies
that had appeared following the death of the Carolinian in 1850.

There

fore, Benton desired to publish Jackson's own words in oi^er to protect
the reputation of the ex-President.
stressed two major areas.

In his defense of Jackson, Benton

To begin with, he emphasized Jackson's state

ment that the comprehensiveness of the War Department orders fully justi
fied the invasion.

In addition, Benton brought out Jackson's view that

Calhoun had played a perfidious role during the entire proceedings.

9john S. Jenkins, Life and Public Services of Andrew Jackson
(Buffalo: G. H. Derby and Co., I85O), p. I65.
^^Benton, Thirty Years' View, I, 167-80.

This
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writer did not stress the defense of Jackson on the basis of international
law because he felt that that aspect was outside the scope of his Thirty
Years' View (1820-1850).

Although the Missourian did not give much atten

tion to his own opinions on the subject, he did not believe, however,
that Monroe had given Rhea the authorization that Jackson desired.

On

the other hand, the huge Westerner thought that the chieftain had been
justified in his acts by the necessities of the border situation.^
Thus it is seen that of the biographers who paved the way for
Parton's monumental work which was published in 1859-60, four—Waldo,
Frost, Jenkins, and Benton—defended the hero, while the rest made no
comment.

It is significant to note that none condemned the general,

and also that none even referred to the "Rhea letter" dispute of 1831.
James Parton, an English-born newspaperman who took up histori
cal writing as the sole means of earning his living, spent twelve months
collecting material for his life of Jackson.

His three-volume work was

considered the best portrayal of "Old Hickory" until Professor Bassett's
more scholarly biography was published in 1916.
While Parton was convinced that the elevation of Jackson to the
presidency had been a mistake on the part of the American people, he
nevertheless tended to justify the general for his actions in Spanish
Florida.

The author believed that the hero of New Orleans was a fighting

man and little more than that.
personalized.

His political controversies were mainly

For example, he hated the Whigs much, but Henry Clay more;

12
nullification much, but Calhoun more; the Bank much, but Biddle more.
^Ibid., I, 180.
12James A. Parton, A Life of Andrew Jackson (3 vols.; New York;
Mason Bros., 1859-1860), III, 694-95*
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In his treatment of the Florida affair. Parton did not use the
same bases of justification which had been advocated by the early writers.
Instead he defended Jackson principally because of the failure of the
government to act after the receipt of his letter of January 6, 1818.

To

the author it vaas inexplicable that the general's proposal could have
been treated so lightly by men who were apparently anxious to acquire
Spanish Florida.

He emphasized this point as follows:

Would any one believe that an affair of such vast impor
tance, which came within a lifting of the finger (so said the
prime minister of England) of involving two nations in war,
could be treated so lightly? Was Andrew Jackson an edged tool
that could be safely played with? He was in earnest when he
wrote that letter to the President. He meant every word of it.
He looked upon himself, and rightly, as the custodian of the
southern frontiers, whose tranquility, he well knew, no vigil
ance could secure as long as a Spanish government ruled, and
British adventurers conspired, in Florida.^3
Parton was also amazed that John Quincy Adams, whose prime responsibility
was foreign affairs, was not even aware of the existence of the letter of
January 6 until the case was reopened by Crawford several years later.^
On the other hand, the biographer was not ready to admit that
Monroe had directly authorized the seizure of the posts through the
medium of the famous "Rhea letter."

Parton agreed that there was no

allusion to the general's letter in any of the correspondence of the
President, but he was not willing to state whether this was due to forgetfulness on the part of Monroe or to his desire to keep the incident
s e c r e t . T h i s w r i t e r a s s e r t e d that the a b s e n c e o f a n y reference t o t h e

^3ibid., II, 436.
^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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"Rhea letter" in the Monroe-Jackson epistles was indeed remarkable.

In

addition, the hostile correspondence between Calhoun and the general was
also devoid of any such reference
As previously mentioned, Monroe failed to recall that he had con
ferred any authorization through Rhea, while Jackson insisted that the
letter had been burned upon the Rhea-carried request of the Virginian.
Parton believed that Monroe did not knowingly give Rhea the mission of
granting approval to Jackson's proposal of January 6, but he thought
that the President might have spoken to the congressman of Jackson's
letter in an offhand manner which Rhea could have misconstrued.

The

biographer asserted that if Monroe had done so he certainly must have
forgotten about it.

Moreover, the biographer stated that there have

been some remarkable lapses of memory in history.

He cited Walter Scott's

situation when he dictated The Bride of Lammermoor while he was suffering
torture from an acute disease.

Later, when the printed novel was placed

in his hands, he declared that he couldn't remember axiy thing except the
basic outline of the story.Therefore, Parton suggested a possible
answer for the question of veracity involved.

Perhaps there had been a

"Rhea letter" which Monroe unknowingly had authorized.
The next biography of the general did not appear until 1882 when
William G. Sumner wrote his Andrew Jackson for The American Statesman
Series.

While Sumner tended to be anti-Jackson, he nevertheless made

this statement about the invasion:
He (Jackson) certainly supposed that he had the secret

^^Ibid.. II, 528.
^"^Ibid., II, 528-29.
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concurrence of the administration in conquering Florida. In 1811,
orders were given to Gen. ^ic^ Matthews to sound the inhabitsints
of East Florida as to coming into the Union; also not to let any
foreign nation occupy Florida. Anyone who knew this might well
infer that the authorities at Washington" would not be scrupulous
about invading Florida.^®
On the other hand, Sumner emphasized the fact that Jackson did not men19
tion the "flhea letter" in his 1818 correspondence with Monroe.
In a biography of the general published in 1900, William G. Brown
merely made reference to the opinion that Jackson had understood that
his suggestion had been approved, and had acted according.

This writer

did not mention other points of justification nor did he go into any
PO
detail on this matter-^
Several years hence, Augustus C. Buell suggested that Monroe's
veracity was in doubt.

The following quotation testifies to this be

lief:
Mr. Monroe was too ill to transact executive business
when he received this letter, but he read it. Then he handed
it to Mr, Calhoun who returned it with the remark that no one
but the President could answer it—or words to that effect.
Shortly afterwards the President sent for Mr, John Rhea, laid
Jackson's letter before him and requested him to write a reply.
Mr- Rhea did so, and in his reply stated to General Jackson that
the President approved the suggestion.2l
So for the first time a writer stated positively that Monroe had erred
in his recollection of the details of the clandestine arrangements.

It

must be noted, however, that the Buell voliunes contained neither foot-

^^William G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson, From The American Statesman
Series, ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 18'82), p. 56.
^^Ibid., p. 65.
2^illiam G. Brown, Andrew Jackson (Boston:
Co., 1900), p. 90.

York:

Houghton Mifflin

Augustus C. Buell, Histoid of Andrew Jackson (2 vols,; New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), II, 115•
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notes nor a bibliography, so there was no indication as to the source of
his alleged facts.
Shortly after-wards, Cyrus T. Brady penned the following concerning
the legality and justification of the invasion:
Jackson had no legal right, of course, to invade Florida
again, although the Seminoles at the instigation of British agents
vjere using Florida as a base from which to war upon the border
settlements of the U. S. The feebled (sic7) Spanish government
protested vainly against this breach of neutrality, but a country
which cannot keep order within its own borders, and which permits
its citizens, or denizens, to make war on their own account upon
a friendly nation has no reasonable ground for complaint if such
disorder is kept down by force, even though its own territory be
invaded for the purpose.22
Thus, Jackson's movements were defended because of the inability of the
Spanish officials to govern their territory effectively.
Concerning the subsequent use of the "Rhea letter" during the
political controversy of 1830, Brady introduced a new facet.

He insisted

that neither Jackson nor Monroe would have lied, but he hinted that Rhea
might have invented the story.

Jackson claimed to have seen the letter,

however, thereby exonerating his fellow-Tennessean from this charge.
writer added that "nobody can explain this matter satisfactorily

The

"23

now.

The Jacksonian biographers, therefore, were quite generous to "Old
Hickory" in their treatments of the Florida proceedings.

Those who wrote

about the other men of the era were not as ready to defend the general,
however.

In fact, several were rather emphatic in their denxanciation of

his actions.
In 1830 George D. Prentice, a Whig newspaperman from New England,

22cyrus T. Brady, The True Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia:
Lippincott Co., 1906), p. 111.
23lb id., p. 190.

J. B.

65
v»as sent to Kentucky to compile material for a biography of Henry Clay.^
In his volume, which was designed to help Henry Clay defeat Jackson in
the 1832 election. Prentice levelled a bitter attack on the general for
his movements in Florida.Prentice referred to the various high
handed and lawless measures of Jackson which were well calculated to
alarm the friends of the Constitution.^^

The author further defamed

the hero of New Orleans with this critical commentary on the Florida
events:
As an excuse for taking St, Marks, the general had informed
the war department, in a letter dated a day or two prior to the
event, that he thought the place a convenient depot for his mllitgiry operations, and was moreover afraid, that, unless he took it,
it would fall into the hands of the Indians. The former reason
is too absurd for notice, and the latter is but little better.
He could not be afraid, that the Indians would possess themselves
of St. Marks. At his bare approach, the frightened fugitives fled
in all directions, without lifting a hand against him; and, when
he had arrived in the vicinity of the fortress, there was scarce
an Indian in all that section of the country.27
Consequently, this writer believed that when Jackson seized the Spanish
28
posts in Florida, he had acted for personal political gain.
Calvin Colton, in his two-volume The Life and Times of Henry Clay,
which was published in I846, did not devote much space to the incident.

2^Dumas Malone (ed.). Dictionary of American Biography (20 vols.;
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1944)» XV, 186. The work, which
was published the following year, made such a favorable impression upon
Kentucky politicians that Prentice was invited to edit an anti-Jacksonian
newspaper in Louisville. Ibid.
25
George D. Prentice, Henry Clay (Hartford:
and John Jay Phelps, 1831), p. 162.
^Ibid., p» 164•
27ibid.. p. 173.
^^bid.. p. 174

Samuel Hanmer, Jr.
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He did say that the administration had been very reluctant to sustain
oQ

Jackson, but had done so as the lesser of two evils7

In other words, it

would have been worse to censure Jackson, thereby giving satisfaction to
Spain.

Neither Colton nor Prentice made any reference to the alleged

authorization carried by John Rhea.
During the same year, William L. MacKenzie published a biography
of Martin Van Buren.

While giving no attention to the points of justi

fication mentioned in 1818 and 1819j this writer did have a definite
opinion on the existence of the "Rhea letter."

MacKenzie felt that the

original "Rhea letter" had been manufactured by Jackson to help Van
Buren in his struggle with Calhoun.

Therefore, Jackson's movements in

30
1818 could not have been defended on the basis of the "Rhea letter."
Several additional biographies of Jackson's contemporaries were
published during the decade preceding the Civil War.

In his John C«

Calhoun, John S. Jenkins merely mentioned the Seminole affair without
31
expressing an opinion on the justification of the general.

Two years

later (1852) the famed journalist, Horace Greeley, edited the biography
of Clay which had been originally written by Epes Sargent ten years be
fore.

The death of Clay in 1852 prompted Greeley to complete the work

32
for Sargent, who was incapacitated at the time.

York:

In his volume, Sargent

29calvin Colton, The Life and Times of Henry Clay (2 vols.; New
A. S. Barnes and Co., 1846), I, 253.

30william MacKenzie, "^e Life ^d Times of Martin Van Buren
(Boston: Cooke and Co., 1846), p. 106.
3^John S. Jenkins, John C. Calhoun (Auburn;
1850), p. 194.

John E. Beardsley,

^^Malone (ed.). Dictionary of American Biography, XVI, 356.
Sargent had become interested in writing a biography of the Kentuckian
while he was serving as Washington correspondent for the Boston Daily
Atlas. Ibid.
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attacked the Tennessean when he referred to the "discreditable history of
33
the wrongs and usurpation perpetrated by General Jackson."

In analyzing

Clay's attack on "Old Hickory" in the House of 1819, the author stated:
Even at that distant day, Mr. Clay saw in the conduct of
General Jackson, the indications of that imperious will-of that
spirit of insubordination—^which, dangerous as they were in a
military commander, were not less pernicious and alarming in a
civil chief magistrate. With his keen instinctive faculty of
penetration, he discovered the despotic and impulsive nature of
the man.
Two separate works on John Quincy Adams, published in 1856 and
1858 respectively, offered little on the subject.

The first, by William

H. Seward, merely referred to Adams' defense of the general without
giving the author's personal opinion.

Seward gave no account whatsoever

35
of the disputed "Rhea letter" or the controversy of 1830-1831.

second, by Josiah Quincy, was equally evasive on the topic.

The

Quincy re

viewed Adams' reasons for vindicating the general, but offered no views
of his own.^^
The next three decades experienced a virtual drouth in biographies
of these principal characters.

The first work of note was John P- Kennedy's

Life of William Wirt, published in 1872, which made no mention at all of
37
the Seminole affair.

While Wirt had been a member of Monroe's cabinet

^^Epes Sargent and Horace Greeley, The Life and Public Services of
Henry Clay (Auburn; Derby and Miller, 1852), p. 82.
^^Ibid., p. 83.

York;

^^WilliamH. Seward, Life and Services of John Quincy Adams (New
Miller, Orton, and Mulligan, 1856), pp. 119-20.

^^Josiah Quincy, Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams (Boston;
Phillips, Sampson, and Co., 1858), pp. 85-88.
^"^John P. Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt (2 vols.;
New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1872).
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at the time of the Florida proceedings, one must remember that he had re
mained virtually silent throughout the meetings.
In 1887 Carl Schurz wrote a biography of Clay in which he men
tioned factors which both favored and opposed Jackson, but he did not
take a definite stand on either side.

Schurz did not feel that the

War Department orders had been broad enough to warrant the general's
actions.

On the other hand, he did think the chieftain's movements had

been justified by the presence of hostile Indians in the area.^®
Actually, the author was mainly concerned with developing the story of
the Clay-Jackson feud, and did not give much attention to the Florida
affair itself.
John T. Morse, the editor of The American Statesman Series, wrote
his own biography of Adams in 189$.

His views on the subject were brief

but definite, as is shown by the following indictment of the general:
Such doubts (boundaries) had proved a ready source of
quarrel, which could hardly be assuaged by General Jackson march
ing about in unquestionable Spanish territory, seizing towns and
hanging people after his lawless, ignorant, energetic fashion.39
Needless to say, Morse did not justify Jackson's actions, nor did he make
any mention of the role of the "Rhea letter" in the matter.
The year 1899 witnessed the publication of three short biographies
for The American Statesman Series—John G» Calhoun by Herman von Hoist;
James Monroe by D. C. Gilman; and Martin Van Buren by Edwin M. Shepard.
Von Hoist believed that the general had acted in good faith in his Florida

3®Carl Schurz, Life of Henry Clay, From The American Statesman
Series, ed. J. T. Morse (2 vols.; Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1887),
I, 151-57^^John T. Morse, John Quincy Adams, From The American Statesman
Series, ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1895), p. 111.

69
expedition.

He indicated that since Jackson's letter of January 6 had

accidentally remained unanswered, the old hero had interpreted the silence
as tacit consent.

Later, without regard to dates, the Tennessean had

misconstrued a letter from the Secretary of War on another matter (chan
neling of all Southern Division correspondence through the commanding
general) as proof that the government had given him full discretion.^®
Von Hoist did not allude to the "Rhea letter," but he thought that Jack
son had been justified by the silence of the administration.^^

Gilman,

writing about Monroe, believed that Jackson had directly violated his
orders.

This writer also stated that the "Rhea letter," which Jackson
Ip
claimed and Monroe disclaimed, was never produced nor authenticated.

Shepard was mainly concerned with protecting Van Buren from implication
in the "Rhea letter" controversy of 1831.

He did not indicate whether

or not he believed that Jackson was justified in his actions.

Also,

the author failed to express a view concerning the existence of the
IQ
alleged missive.
The last major pre-World War I biography examined was J. E. D.
Shipp's work on William H. Crawford, published in 1909.

Shipp referred

to the enmity between his subject and the general, and bitterly condemned

^^erman von Hoist, John C« Calhoun, From The American Statesman
Series, ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1899), p. 89.
^^Ibid.
^^Daniel G. Gilman, James Monroe, From The American Statesman
Series, ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1899), p. 145.
^3Edward M. Shepard, Martin Van Buren, From The American Statesman Series, ed. J. T. Morse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1899),
p. 187.
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Jackson for the 1818 invasion.

Shipp has written:

On the pretext that the Spanish authorities were inciting the
Indians to commit outrages in Georgia and under the plea of mili
tary necessity, Jackson invaded the Spanish territory of Florida,
seizing St. Marks and Pensacola.^
The words "pretext" and "plea of military necessity" indicate that Shipp
did not approve of the chieftain's actions.
Most of the principal historians writing in the era covered in
this chapter did not delve deeply into the problem.

The first multi-

volume history to give any attention whatsoever to the dispute was pub
lished by Richard Hildreth in 1849-1853his treatment of the matter.

Yet Hildreth was very brief in

The author recognized that the seizure of

St. Marks and Pensacola had been without specific orders.

On the other

hand, "considering the aid and encouragement offered by these posts to
the hostile Indians," Hildreth considered Jackson's act "abundantly
justifiable on the principle of self-defense."^^

He expressed no opin

ion at all concerning the existence of the "Rhea letter."
Years later, James Schouler began his rather extensive study of
the Seminole proceedings and, specifically, the "Rhea letter" itself.
He published important articles in periodicals in 1884 and 1905.

In

addition, his lengthy history of the United States covered the Florida
affair thoroughly.

The first volume of this work was released in 1894.

In his history Schouler indicated that while the Seminole affair
was not an important military operation, Jackson's role in the proceedings

^J. E, D. Shipp, The Giant Days; The Life and Times of William
H. Crawford (Americus, Georgia: Southern Printers, 1909), p. 151.
^^Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of America
(6 vols.; New York: Harper and Bros., 1849-1853),
646.
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was later of major significance from a political standpoint.

Early in

his narrative of the Florida invasion, the historian "wrote:
The Seminole war, with its singular political consequences,
absorbed a large share of the public attention during the second
session of this Congress. So far as that war related to the imme
diate belligerents and their hostile encounters, it hardly deserved
so imposing a title; but the disputes, domestic and international,
which Jackson's method of conducting it engendered, gives to that
contest a memorable importance in our history.46
In relating the story of the Seminole war, Schouler was willing
to condemn the general for the proposal he had made in his letter of
January 6, 1818, to the President.

The historian apparently believed

that Jackson had desired personal political gain from such an invasion.
The following statement emphasized his opinion:
This singular epistle, which indicated on the general's
part a personal wish to carry the war into Spain precisely as
he afterwards did, heedless of the lawlessness of such a course
and the perfidy to which it must have exposed our responsible
Executive in the eyes of mankind, was written from Nashville
before Jackson had received his marching orders.47
Furthermore, Schouler questioned the authenticity of the state
ments by which the general sought to justify his action in capturing
Pensacola.

According to the historian, Jackson's own testimony has shown

that he marched to Pensacola only after the receipt of word that the In
dians were assembling a force which was being assisted by active Spanish
aid.

Even then, Jackson had insisted that his decision to seize the

garrison had been made after the Spanish commandant had threatened to use
Zi.8
force if the American troops did not vacate the area immediately.^

46James B. Schouler, A History of the United States of America
(7 vols.; New York; Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1894-1913)# HI* 57^'^Ibid.. Ill, 69.
^^Ibid., Ill, 74-75.
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But, said Schouler, Jackson's posthumous statement, published by
Benton, made the important admission that the general had seized Pensacola
and virtually annexed Florida to the United States in accordance with the
plan proposed by him in his letter to Monroe on January 6, 1818.

There

fore, the historian believed that the events which occurred in and near
Pensacola were only incidental in view of Jackson's well-laid plans to
L9
seize East Florida.
Schouler also went on to question the theory that Jackson was
justified because of the danger that the redmen might again attack the
settlers in Georgia and Alabama.

Nor was the historian willing to admit

that the duplicity of the Spanish officials provided sufficient grounds
for the general's deeds,

Schouler agreed that the governor at St. Marks

xnight have been an accomplice of the Seminoles, but he did not believe
that the other Spanish commandants were clearly implicated.

Even if all

the officials had been guilty, added the writer, it would not have been
necessary to seize the posts on the principle of self-preservation.

In

addition, Schouler said that Jackson should not have presumed that the
Spanish government sanctioned the treachery of her provincial agents.^®
Concerning the famed "Rhea letter," Schouler denied that Monroe
had ever authorized the writing of such a note.

He averred that there

was no allusion in all of Jackson's correspondence with the President to
a private understanding inconsistent with the orders of the War Department.
Indeed, the justification relied upon in those letters was based upon the

^^Ibid.. Ill, 75.
^^Ibid., Ill, 77'
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premise that Jackson had misinterpreted the intent of those directives.
Furthermore, Monroe on December 21, 1818, had explained his not having
read the January 6 letter, and Jackson apparently had been satisfied
with the President's account of the incident.

Consequently, Schouler laid most of the blame for the controversy
over the alleged authorization directly on the doorstep of the general.
At the same time, he recognized the vjeakness of Rhea, who had been so
willing to help his old friend.

The historian referred to Rhea as "a

man never of much reputation, who is remembered in history only as one
of Jackson's constant parasites.Schouler also believed that the
political circumstances in 1818-1819 made it inherently impossible that
Monroe should have issued the secret order through Rhea.^^
Furthermore, in response to the theory that Rhea might have
attempted to deceive Jackson by writing the letter in 1818 without
Monroe's consent, Schouler said that Rhea had neither the nerve nor the
cunning to play such a role.^^

This writer also wondered at the allega

tion that the general had burned the secret letter in April, 1819, upon
the request of Rhea.

He stated:

Why should one of the General's astuteness have acted thus
on Rhea's oral request unsupported by proof that the request came
from the President and without a suspicion of Rhea's motives in

^^Ibid., Ill, 82-83.
52schouler, "Monroe and the Rhea Letter," Magazine of American
History, XII (October, 1884), 315.
^^Ibid.. p. 311.
^^Schouler, "Jackson suid Van Buren Papers,A t l a n t i c M o n t h l y ,
XCV (February, 1905), 219.
55ibid.

74
making it?^^
Finally, Schouler attacked the circumstances surrounding Rhea's letter to
Monroe in June, 1831, in the following manner:
John Rhea, now superannuated, wrote to trap ex-President
Monroe into a correspondence which would import that by some
means the latter had connived at a treacherous seizure of the
Floridas, and had sent through Rhea himself the hint that Jack
son desired. This idea was utterly preposterous, and the whole
correspondence of 1818 belied it.57
According to Schouler, perhaps Jackson and Rhea thought Monroe was too
near death in 1831 to defend himself
It was inexplicable to this writer that neither Rhea nor Jackson
pretended to state the substance of the burned letter, the dates of Rhea's
interview with Monroe, the terms of the supposed authority, or any other
details.
able.

According to Schouler, only one of two theories appeared ten

First, that Rhea transmitted to the general in Florida a pretended

authority which the President had never given him.

This might well e^qjlain

the anxiety of the Congressxnan in 1819 that his letter to the chieftain
should be destroyed.

Second, that the whole story was fabricated in 1831

by Rhea and others in the confidence of Jackson in order to complete the
political discrediting of Calhoun,

Schouler accepted the second theory

Thus, James Schouler condemned the 1818 deeds of Jackson.

He

rejected the grounds of self-defense, misconduct of Spanish officials,
and the comprehensive nature of the War Department orders as suitable ex
planations for the general's actions.

Also, Schouler refused to accept

56schouler, Magazine of American History, p. 321.
^'^Schouler, History. IV, 37-38.
5%chouler, Atlantic Monthly, p, 220.
^^Schouler, Magazine of American History, p. 322.
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the existence of the "Rhea letter."

The historian was unable, however,

to explain satisfactorily Monroe's failure to act upon the chieftain's
letter of January 6, 1818.
Other historians of the pre-World War I era did not emphasize
the Florida affair.

In 1895, Benson J. Lossing, an admirer of Jackson,

justified the general on the principle that the public safety could not
have been secured in any other way.
"Rhea letter," however-

60

This writer did not mention the

Similarly, Woodrow Wilson believed that

Jackson had been justified by the necessity of immediate action in a
situation which had apparently developed since his orders were issued.
Wilson, also, did not express an opinion concerning the existence of
the alleged secret missive.

In 1906, Kendric C. Babcock laid the

blame for the entire affair on Monroe and Adams.

He intimated that the

secret of their whole game was to compel Spain to cede Florida, and to
this end, the President and the Secretary contrived skillfully.
Babcock felt that Jackson had been wronged in the cabinet and in the
congressional proceedings, and needed to be elected President as a re
ward for having his integrity impeached because of acts committed in the
name of the nation.Moreover, H. Addington Bruce, in an essay pub
lished in 1908, implied that whether or not Jackson had been authorized
by Monroe to attack the posts, his actions were justified by the necessity

York:

^'^Benson J. Lossing, History of the United States (8 vols.; New
Lossing History Co., 1895), V, 1323.

^^Woodrow Wilson, History of the United States (5 vols.; New York:
Harper and Bros., 1902), III, 255-58.
^%endric C. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, Vol. XIII
of The American Nation; A History, ed~ A. B. Hart (28 vols,j New York:
Harper and Bros., 1906), 280.
^^ibid., p. 282.
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of the situation.

Bruce believed, that Jackson's movements brought to a

head the formulation of the Florida Treaty of 1819, and were therefore
in accordance with our over-all policy of westward expansion which had
begun with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.^^
The final history of this period was con^leted by J, B. McMaster
in 1913.

Although he apparently believed that Jackson was justified be

cause he had misinterpreted his broad orders, McMaster did not state
any further opinions on the problem.

Concerning the "Rhea letter," this

writer recognized that Jackson's claim and Monroe's denial were utterly
irreconcilable.

He did not express his own views on the dispute, how-

ever -65
Thus, the views of the biographers and historians from 1819 to
1914 have been examined.

The biographers of Jackson overwhelmingly de

fended their subject, although their bases for supporting him varied
considerably.

The necessity of protecting the frontier was given as the

chief defense of Jackson by Waldo, Jenkins, and Benton,

Frost and Brown

emphasized the comprehensive nature of the War Department orders, while
Parton and Sumner stressed the failure of the administration to answer
Jackson's letter of January 6, 1818.

In addition, the misconduct of the

Spanish officials was cited by Brady and Waldo.

None of Jackson's

biographers condemned him, although several"" either failed to mention

Addington Bruce, "Andrew Jackson and the Acquisition of
Florida," Outlook. LXXXVIII (March 28, 1908), 730-42.
^^John Bach McMaster, History of the People of the United States
(8 vols.; New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1884-1913), IV, 437-56.
Jerome Smith, Cobbett, Seba Smith, A Citizen of Western New
York, and Dusenberry.
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the matter or had no opinion.
The biographers of Jackson's contemporaries, however, have taken
an entirely different viev# of the problem.

Only two, Schurz and von

Hoist, defended the general for his actions in Florida.

The former based

his opinion on the necessity of defending the frontier, while von Hoist
believed that the silence of the government was interpreted by Jackson
as a tacit approval of his proposal of January 6. On the other hand.
Prentice, Sargent, Morse, and Shipp asserted that the Tennessean had
acted for personal political gain without being authorized by Monroe.
The general's violation of the Constitution was cited by Gilman and
Prentice, while Colton stated that Jackson was sustained by the govern
ment only because popular opinion would not have allowed giving in to the
Spanish demands for censure.
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Several ' biographers did not refer to the

Seminole controversy.
The major historians of the period tended to justify the chieftain,
however-

The most widely used reason, the necessity of defending the

frontier, was emphasized by Hildreth, Lossing, Wilson, and Bruce.

Bab-

cock believed that Monroe and Adams had planned the entire affair as an
instrument of pressure against Spain, and that Jackson was their innocent
tool.

McMaster referred to the general's misinterpretation of his orders

as the basis for his defense of Jackson.

On the other hand, the only

condemnation of the general came from Schouler-

This historian believed

that the hero of New Orleans had violated his orders willfully.

In addi

tion, he insisted that there was no foundation for defending Jackson on
the grounds of the misconduct of the Spsinish officials or of the necessity

^'^MacKenzie, Jenkins, Seward, Quincy, Shepard, and Kennedy.
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of protecting the frontierThe writers of the era also have given considerable attention to
the existence of the "Rhea letter."

Only one biographer of Jackson,

Augustus B u e l l , believed that there a c t u a l l y w a s a "Rhea l e t t e r ^ " a s t h e
general claimed.

Several^® indicated that there was no such missive,

r

although Parton suggested that Rhea might have been referring to another
subject when he wrote a letter on January 12, 1818.
writers did not even mention the controversy.
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Most
of the early

Brady added in 1906 that

no one could satisfactorily explain the matter at that time.
None of the biographers of Jackson's contemporaries accepted the
"Rhea letter" story.

Only two, MacKenzie and Oilman, actually stated

that the missive was a fabrication, however.

The others
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did not give

their views on the existence of the letterOf the historians, only Schouler expressed a view on the alleged
authorization.

He indicated his belief that Monroe had never given the

desired hint to Rhea; moreover, the whole story was an invention by the
Jacksonians in order to crush Calhoun completelyThus, the path had been prepared for the work of John Spencer
Bassett, and for the more recent views of other biographers and historians.

^^Benton, Parton, Sumner, and Brown.
^"^Waldo, Jerome Smith, Cobbett, Seba Smith, A Citizen of Western
New York, Dusenberry, Frost, and Jenkins.
'^^Jenkins, Sargent, Quincy, Shepard, Prentice, Colt on, Seward,
Kennedy, Schurz, Morse, von Hoist, and Shipp.

CHAPTER IV

VIEWPOINTS FROM 1914 TO THE PRESENT

The preceding chapters have considered the views on the Florida
question of Jackson and his contemporaries, as well as of biographers
and historians up to 1914.

In this chapter, the writings of authors from

the outbreak of World W&.r I until the present will be examined.

Again,

the biographers of Jackson will be studied first, followed by the biogra
phers of contemporaries and, then, the major historians of the period.
The opinions of these writers on both the justification of the general
and the existence of the "Rhea letter" will be presented.
During World War I, John Spencer Bassett completed his excellent
portrayal of Jackson's life.

Considerably shorter than Parton's work,

Bassett's biography was much more scholarly.

His study is still accepted

as the most authoritative summary of the career of "Old Hickory."
Bassett's contributions to the Florida historiography were exten
sive.

He has offered theories concerning the Florida invasion of 1818,

some of which had not been tendered or investigated by the early writers.
In addition, his writings have had considerable influence on the more
recent studies of the entire Jacksonian era.
Bassett believed that Monroe was happy to have Jackson in a posi
tion to seize the Florida province if negotiations with Spain should
falter.

This writer, therefore, assumed that the President should have
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backed his general to a greater degree in the subsequent hearings
Bassett based most of his defense of the hero of New Orleans on
the general's interpretation of Monroe's response, or lack of response,
2
to the proposal penned from the Hermitage on January 6, 1818.

Yet

Bassett did not approve of Jackson's proposal to seize the territory, be
cause he felt that such a move was not sound from the stajidpoint of foreign
3
policy.

Also, this writer said that Jackson, when he left Tennessee early

in 1818, did not actually intend to carry out his threat to seize all of
Florida.

After seizing St. Marks, the general was preparing to vacate

the area when he received word on May 5^ 1818, that hostile Indians were
assembling at Pensacola.

It was then, according to Bassett, that he de

cided to carry out his early proposal.^

As Bassett thought that Jackson

had been justified in his actions because of the failure of the adminis
tration to answer the January 6 letter, he gave little attention to the
other reasons submitted earlier.
Concerning the chieftain's statement that he had been given an
authorization from Monroe through the medium of John Rhea, this histor
ian expressed some definite views.

According to Bassett, both men were

of unquestionable honesty, yet the reader must choose between their
widely differing statements.

But, Monroe, as an educated man and a

trained official, probably had a more reliable memory,

^John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), pp.
,
^Ibid., p. 249.
3 lb id., p. 246.
^Ibid.

Jackson's
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defense, which he prepared at the time but did not publish, showed that
he was not scholarly minded.

The writer added that there is more probabil-

ity that his memory was inferior to that of Monroe.'^

Moreover, according

to Bassett, there were at least four facts that weakened Jackson's story.
In the first place, the Tennessean never gave more thaji a very general
account of the alleged letter from Rhea.
Jackson misunderstood its true meaning.

Even if it were written, perhaps
Second, although he insisted that

he had made a note concerning the elusive document opposite the copy of
his January 6 epistle in his letterbook, no such letterbook has ever been
found.

Bassett believed that Jackson would have been more careful to

preserve this bit of corroborating evidence after the loss of the main
piece, if he had possessed it.

Third, Bassett questioned the necessity

o f destroying t h e "Rhea l e t t e r " i n order t o k e e p it f r o m harming o u r r e 
lations with Spain.

His belief was based on the fact that the treaty

acquiring Florida had already been signed in February, 1819, and it was
expected that Spain would ratify it at once.
been gained by destroying the letter.

Thus, nothing could have

Finally, Bassett asserted that

Jackson's case was injured by the fact that Rhea could not recall the
particulars of the incident, and had to receive some promptings from the

6

general before he could speak out.

While not accepting Jackson's story that a direct authorization
from Monroe had been received, this biographer stated that Rhea had
written a letter to the general on January 12, 1818.

However, that note

did not deal with Jackson's proposal; instead it concerned an entirely

^Ibid.. p. 247^Ibid.. pp. 247-48.
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difi'erent matter.

Jackson had been feuding with his superiors about

their sending of orders directly to his subordinate officers without
making the information known to the division commander.

Bassett thus

stated:
It is possible that some approving e^qjression of Monroe in
a later conversation with Rhea was reported by the latter to Jackson
in such a way that the general would take it for the hint to invade
Florida. Neither Monroe nor Rhea then knew about the suggestion of
January 6, and an approving expression of the former may have been
innocently reported by the latter in such a way as to convey a
world of meaning to the expectant Jackson. We can hardly doubt
that Jackson burned, as he alleged, a letter from Rhea containing
some statement, which he took for permission; the statement so
interpreted must, therefore, have referred to something else. This
explcination seems more probable, since neither Jackson nor Overton
gives any definite notion of now the permission in the burned
letter was worded. The alternative to this theory, as far as I
can see, is to hold that either Jackson or Monroe made false asser
tions, with the probability in favor of Jackson's guilt. It is
difficult to believe this of either man.7
Thus, even though he did not accept the "Rhea letter" story as
Jackson had claimed it, Bassett believed that he had acted with cause,
Bassett's findings were to influence other biographers and historians
in their later writings about Jackson.
Consequently, Frederic Austin Ogg used some of Bassett's inter
pretations when he wrote his Reign of Andrew Jackson in 1919 for The
Chronicles of America Series.

Ogg asserted that the general had felt

that his powers as he interpreted them from the War Department orders
were very broad.

Jackson had not looked upon the invasion as a mere

punitive expedition but as a means of acquiring permanent possession of
a territory much desired by the United States.

In addition, this author

further defended the chieftain on the grounds that the silence of the
administration following the receipt of his January 6 letter indicated
"^Ibid., p. 249.
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that his plans had the full, if secret, approval of the government.
According to Ogg, one premise that v»as perfectly certain iNas that Jack
son, when he carried his troops into Florida in 1818, had believed that
the administration expected him to prepare the territory for permanent
9
American occupation.

This author, however, did not express any belief

that t h e r e was a n a c t u a l " R h e a l e t t e r " w r i t t e n t o t h e general.

His de

fense of the hero was solely that Jackson thought that the failure of
the administration to reject his proposal meant that it was actually
granting approval.
In 1922 Claude G. Bowers published a volume entitled The Party
Battles of the Jackson Period.

Bowers asserted that the alleged "Rhea

letter" was introduced by the Jacksonians in an effort to punish Calhoun
for having dared to oppose the hero in 1818-1819.

This author named the

Van Buren-Calhoun struggle for the succession to the Presidency as the
chief reason for bringing the old controversy to light.

Bowers said

nothing more about the letter, nor did he give any opinion as to whether
or not the general was justified in his actions.^^
Five years later another biography of the Tennessean was pub
lished by Gerald W. Johnson.

Johnson referred to the January 6 letter

as "an outrageous proposal, a low, dishonest, cynical proposal, no doubt.

^Frederic A. Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson; A Chronicle of
the Frontier in Politics, Vol. XX of The Chronicles of America Series,
ed. Allen Johnson (50 vols. j New HaverTi Yale University Press, 1919
55-56.
9Ibid., p. 57^^Claude G. Bowers, The Party Battles of the Jackson Period
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922), pp. 88-115.
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but highly practical statecraft, nevertheless."^^

Yet, this author was

inclined to believe that Monroe, despite his pointblank denial of having
responded to the suggestion, must have had some sort of a conversation
•with Rhea in which each completely misunderstood what the other was talk
ing about.

But Calhoun had seen Jackson's letter, and must have under-

12
stood what was in the general's mind.

Therefore, stated this writer,

Jackson understood that Rhea had given him the desired answer, as the
13
government had slyly approved his proposal.

Under such circumstances,

Johnson believed that the general was justified in his actions.^
David Karsner's brief biography of Jackson and Mary A. Suber's
unpublished master's thesis written in 1929 and 1930, respectively, gave
scant attention to the controversy.

Karsner indicated that the general

was not justified on the point of self-defense, but did not have an
15
opinion concerning the "Rhea letter."

Suber said nothing at all about

the Seminole proceedings.^^
In the first volume of his biography of the chieftain, published
in 1933, Marquis James defended him because of the administration's fail
ure to act upon his January 6 proposal.

James accepted Monroe's conten

tion that the ex-President had not empowered Rhea to convey any assurance
^Gerald W. Johnson, Andrew Jackson (New York:
and Co., 1927), p. 196.

Mint on, Balch,

^^Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 198-99.
^Ibid., pp. 196-99 •
^^David Karsner, Andrew Jackson (New York:
pp. 260-61.

Brentano's, 1929),

^Mary A. Suber, "Andrew Jackson, Pioneer" (Unpublished Masters
thesis. University of Minnesota, 1930).
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to Jackson.

"On the other hand," stated the writer,—"and this is far

more important—the evidence is clear that the administration understood
General Jackson's intentions toward Florida, and, by the absence of any
restraining sign or syllable, gave its consent to them."17
'

This author

went on to show that the War Department was well aware of what was going
on in Florida.

James stated that "after he received word of the occupa

tion of St, Marks, Secretary of War Calhoun wrote Governor Bibbs of
Alabama:

'General Jackson is vested with full power to conduct the war

18

as he may think best.'"

James believed that Calhoun, and supposedly

Monroe, knew full well what Jackson had planned for Florida, having read
t h e Tennessean's clear l e t t e r o f January 6 , 1 8 1 8 . ^ ^
In his second volume. Portrait of a President, which appeared in
1937, James made little reference to the revival of the controversy in
1830-31.

While attacking Calhoun for his duplicity in the affair, he
20

did not change his views concerning Jackson's justification.

In 1939 Frances Norene Ahl attacked Jackson in the following
manner:
I ask with whom was General Jackson waging war? Not with
the Indian tribes because these tribes he had subdued and con
quered. His use of the military forces of the United States
must be viewed as an act of war against Spain, and in that light,
must be considered as an usurpation of the powers of Congress and
a direct violation of the laws and Constitution of the United
States
^"^Marquis James, Andrew Jackson, The Border Captain (Indiana
polis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1933), p. 308.
^^Ibid., pp. 308-09.
^^Ibid., p. 309.
^^James, Portrait of a President, p. 239.
^Iprances N. Ahl, Andrew Jackson ajid the Constitution (Boston:
Christopher Publishing House, 1939), p. 47.
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She did not, however, make any reference to the "Rhea letter."
Harold C. Syrett, in a recent wjrk, offered the belief that the
chieftain had been justified on the doctrine of self-defense.

This

author, however, gave no opinion concerning the controversial "Rhea
letter.
In 1955, in a volume expanded from his doctoral dissertation,
John W. Ward emphasized a point barely mentioned by several earlier
writers.

This involved the role played by Jackson's popularity among

the masses of the people.

This writer expressed himself as follows:

The Seminole affair had many facets. It involved domestic
politics as well as foreign relations, the philosophy of American
expansionism as well as international law. But an aspect not
generally noted was the way in which the Seminole affair disclosed
the sharply activistic temper of the American people. The people
approved Jackson's actions in Florida and resisted any efforts to
translate his deeds i n t o abstractions w h i c h h a d a relevance b e 
yond the immediate situation. The opposition to Jackson in
Congress attempted to censxire Jackson on the high grounds of in
ternational law and to impugn his character by suggesting that
his disregard for authority outside himself presented a grave
threat to the democratic process. But. . .the people cared little
for the letter of the law; they admired the man of action, the man
of self-reliance,23
Ward went on to assert that the general had been opposed mainly by men
who were more concerned about Jackson's political possibilities than the
pi,

legal aspects of the proceedings.

Thus, Ward apparently believed that

the cabinet and the congressional attacks upon the general were not
generated by their disapproval of the Florida acts as much as by their

22Harold C. Syrett, Andrew Jackson (Indianapolis:
Merrill Co., 1953), p. 70.
23John W. Ward, Andrew Jackson:
Oxford University Press, 1955), P* 58.
24ibid., p. 60.

The Bobbs-

Symbol for an Age (New York:
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fear of the rising popularity of Jackson.

Ward did not express any

views about the existence of the "Rhea letter."
Again, the Jacksonian writers tended to be generous to the hero
in their treatments of the Seminole proceedings.

"Old Hickory" did not

fare as well in the eyes of the biographers of his contemporaries, how
ever.

It will also be seen that a number of these writers gave little

or no attention to the problem, indicating that it was not as important
to them as it was to the Jacksonians.
William M. Meigs' study of Calhoun was published in 1917-

Meigs

did not express an opinion on the problem as his discussion of the
Florida affair mainly involved a defense of Calhoun's role in the pro
ceedings.^^
Claude M. Fuess, a biographer of Daniel Webster, did not even
allude to the Seminole controversy in his work published in 1930.

This

seems strange, as Webster was directly involved in the nullification
dispute which helped complete the rift between Jackson and Calhoun.
In his The Adams Family, completed in 1931, James Truslow Adams
simply condemned the general for later turning against John Quincy Adams
who had been his only defender during the cabinet meetings of July,
1818.This -writer gave no other opinion about the controversyIn the following year Bennett C. Clark, in a biography of Adsims,
expressed the following view concerning the "Rhea letter:"
25vfilliam M. Meigs, The Life of John C. Calhoun (2 vols.; New York;
The Neale Publishing Co., 1917)j H> 386.
^Claude M. Fuess, Daniel Webster (2 vols.; Boston:
and Co., 1930), I.
^"^James Truslow Adams, The Adams Family (New York:
Guild, 1930), p. 172.
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The truth of this singular episode has never fully appeared.
Monroe and Jackson "were both men of unquestioned veracity, yet the
President denied and Jackson strongly asserted, to a large degree
supported by Rhea, that he had received the hint which he had re
quested. A possible explanation is that the message Monroe in
tended to convey was one of sympathy -with Jackson in one of his
numerous controversies, probably one he had then raging with his
superior officer. General Jacob Brown. Be that as it may, Jackson
unquestionably considered that he had the approval of the Presi
dent and proceeded accordingly.28
Hence, Clark defended the general on the basis of the failure of the
administration to send a reply to his proposal of January 6, 1818.

He

also believed, as did Bassett, that a letter was written by Rhea to
Jackson, but not one which carried Monroe's authorization to seize
Florida.
The next major work considered was Glyndon G. Van Deusen's biog
raphy of Henry Clay, which was completed in 1937.

This writer merely

repeated Bassett's theory that the general's memory must have played
him false in regard to the alleged authorization from Monroe.^®

Van

Deusen did not further discuss the justification of the Tennesseaxi.
In 1944i Charles M. Wiltse completed the first part of his threevolume biography of Calhoun.

In this work, the writer "debunked"

Bassett's theory that a letter from Rhea to Jackson concerning an en
tirely different matter could have been construed by the chieftain as
the desired authorization.

Wiltse stated that Rhea's letter was written

on January 12, 1818; therefore, Jackson should have realized that his own

2®Bennett C. Clark, John Quincy Adams;
Little, Brown, and Co., 1932), p. 144'

Old Man Eloquent (Boston:

^^Ibid., p. 145.
^^Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston;
Brown, and Co., 1937), p. 124-
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letter of January 6 could not have possibly been answered by that date.-^
This witer also placed the b3-ajne for the controversy of 1830-1831 square
ly upon the shoulders of Jackson.

Wiltse believed that the Tennessean's

emphasis on the alleged "Rhea letter" was only a device to drive Calhoun
from the party.

According to this biographer, Jackson's reasons for

purging Calhoun were twofold.

First, the President felt that he had been

•wronged by Calhoun during the 1818 cabinet meetings; and second, Jackson
32
blamed the South Carolinian for the Eaton affair.

The years of 1945 and 1946 saw the publication of two works on
the life of James Monroe.

The first, by Arthur Styron, brushed lightly

over the Seminole controversy.

He did, however, back Monroe in the

Virginian's contention that the "Rhea letter" had never been written.
The author added that neither the letter, nor any trace of it, has ever
been found.
On the other hand, William P. Cresson delved more deeply into
the problem.
matter.

Cresson completely exonerated Monroe from any blame in the

He asserted that it was natural that the President, being ill,

should have turned Jackson's letter of January 6 over to Calhoun and
Crawford.

This was because the Virginian saw that the letter dealt with

Florida, and he assumed that there was nothing concerning that campaign
that needed his personal attention.

Therefore, reasoned Cresson, Monroe

^^Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (3 vols.; Indianapolis:
Bobbs^ilerrill Co., 1944-1951), I, 156.

The

^^Ibid., II, 67^^Arthur Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats; James Monroe and
the Virginia Dynasty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1945),
p. 352.
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thought that Calhoun should handle what appeared to the President to be a
routine letterThus, this writer tended to place the blame for the
ensuing controversy on Calhoun and Crawford who had read the letter and
35
should have understood Jackson's proposal.

Cresson also felt strongly

that if Monroe had read the letter and had commissioned Rhea to answer
it there would have been some a3J.usion to it in the lengthy Jackson36
Monroe correspondence carried on from July to December, 1818.

In

reference to Monroe's later statement, made in 1827, that Rhea had agreed
that the matter had not been discussed by the two men, this biographer
stated:

"It is reasonably safe to assume, then, in the light of this

evidence and of Monroe's personal integrity, that he never had any
dealings with John Rhea."^'^
Consequently, one must conclude that Cresson not only refused to
acknowledge the existence of the "Rhea letter," but failed in any way to
justify the general's rape of the Spanish posts.

This was further

evidenced by his statement that "the acquisition of the Floridas by
diplomacy rather than conquest was absolutely necessary to preserve
peace in that area and to stamp out the Indian depredations."^®
Samuel Flagg Bemis, in a work on Adams published in 1949, re
viewed the New Englander's role in the Seminole affair-

The author

^^William P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill:
of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 304-06.

The University

^^Ibid., p. 305.
^^Ibid.
^"^Ibid.
3Qlbid.. p. 308.
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indicated that Jackson undoubtedly acted in the belief that the adminis
tration's silence meant consent.

On the other hand, Bemis did not place

much stock in Bassett's theory concerning the January 12 letter from Rhea
to Jackson.Yet this writer believed that Adams' vindication of the
general on the grounds of self-defense and the misconduct of the Spanish
officials was certainly correct.^®
In a recently published volume, Bemis expressed the view that the
controversy of 1830 was strictly political in nature.

In referring to

this dispute Bemis said that Adams
knew what was back of all this controversy. Crawford still nursed
his old rancorous feud with Calhoun; the Georgian was glad to lend
himself vindictively to the new and bitter conflict between Van
Buren and Calhoun for the succession, in which the Red Fox of
Kinderhook now had Jackson's active alliance.
Thus, this writer further hints that there was no authorization from
Monroe in 1818.
A year later G. A. Lipsky completed a volume on Adams in which he
mentioned that the Puritan had supported the general in the proceedings.
This writer did not express any views on the justification of the hero,
however
Margaret L. Coit's portrayal of Calhoun, released during the same
year, did not devote much space to the controversy.

She did state that

39samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundation of
American Foreign Policy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), p. 320.
^Qlbid.. p. 321.
^^Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York:
1956), pp. 213-14.

A. A. Knopf,

^^George A. Lipsky, John Quincy Adams, His Theories and Ideas
(New York: Crowell, 1950), pp. 475-80.
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apparently Rhea sav» Monroe, took some unguarded remark for the desired
hint, and passed the approval to Jackson.Thus, Coit rejected the
opinion previously stated by Schouler^^ and Bassett^^ that Rhea knew
nothing about the general's letter of January 6.

This writer did not

maice any further reference to the subject.
Thus, the biographers of Jackson's contemporaries widely differed
in their interpretations of the problem.

In general, the Adams writers

tended to support the Tennessean, while the Calhoun and Monroe biogra
phers condemned his actions.

Several others—Fuess, Meigs, Van Deusen,

and Lipsky—failed to express viewpoints.
While the biographers of the post-Vforld W-r I period have been
quite active, few major historians have entered into the Seminole con
troversy.

The principal treatments of the problem were by Richard R.

Stenberg, who condemned the general's actions, and George Dangerfield,
who blamed others as well as Jackson.

The other historians, in the

main, had little to say about the affair in their respective voliames.
In 1916, E. B, Andrews completed his multi-volume History of the
United States.

In the third volume of the series, the historian made a

brief reference to the invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818.

Andrews did

not accept the doctrine that Jackson had received secret approval for his
plans.

On the other hand, he did not believe that the general had will

fully disobeyed War Department orders.

To illustrate his point, the

^^argaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun;
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 122.

^^Refer to Chapter III, p. 73^^Refer to Chapter IV, p. 82.

American Portrait (Boston:
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historian wrote:
To clear out the filibusterers, the chief source of the In
dian's discontent ever since before the Creek War, the hero of New
Orleans, mistakenly supposing himself to be fortified by his Govern
ment's concurrence, boldly took forcible possession of all East
Florida.^"
Several years later (1922) Edward Channing expressed the opinion
that Jackson's orders had not been perfectly clear; therefore, the gen
eral had been forced to act according to his own judgment as to what was
necessary under the existing circumstances.

The author indicated, how

ever, that Monroe felt that Jackson must have acted on facts that were
unknown to the administration.^'^

Neither Channing nor Andrews gave any

attention to the "Rhea letter" itself.
Ten years hence, Margeruite B. Hamer, writing in the official
publication of the East Tennessee Historical Society, submitted two
theories dealing with the "Rhea letter" controversy.

First, she asserted

that Rhea's failure to remember the letter of authorization to Jackson
may have been due to his senility in 1831.

Secondly, she averred that

Rhea's alleged answer to Jackson apparently involved another question.^®
This latter view, of course, was £ilso held by Bassett.

Miss Hamer, how

ever, did not indicate which of the two possibilities was more acceptable
to her.

York:

A-^Elisha B. Andrews, History of the United States (6 vols.; New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894-1917), III> 46-47•

^"^Edward Channing, A History of the United States (6 vols.. New
The Macmillan Co., 1905-1925), V, 335.
ig
Margeruite B. Hamer, "John Rhea of Tennessee," East Tennessee
Historical Society Publications, No. 4 (January, 1932), 43.
York:
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Writing in the Journal of Southern History in 1936, Richard R.
Stenberg levelled a bitter indictment at the general for his statement
that Monroe had secretly authorized the seizure of Florida.

According

to this writer, "the General's private letter of January 6, 1818, read
in the light of his subsequent actions, shows that he intended to force
upon the administration the annexation of Florida; and he openly con
fessed later, in his 'Exposition against Calhoun' (1831), that he had
intended to seize and occupy Florida when he entered it."^^

In addition,

Stenberg asserted that Rhea's letter to Jackson on December 18, 1818,
proved that the congressman had not been aware of transmitting an
50
authorization to the general in January, 1818.

To this writer, Rhea's

failure in 1831 to recall any of the particulars involved in the alleged
51
letter further proved the duplicity of Jackson in the affair.

Stenberg

believed that Jackson's story had been accepted by some historians be
cause of the traditional honesty attributed to him.

According to this

writer, the absence of any reference to the "Rhea letter" in the pri
vate Monroe-Jackson correspondence of 1818 proved, however, that the
general's reputation for truthfulness was not justified.^^

So Stenberg

concluded, "whether frajned to meet the political exigency of 1827 or
that of 1830, or framed at some earlier time, Jackson's 'Rhea letter'
5'3
story is a fabrication equally transparent."^-^

^^Richard R. Stenberg, "Jackson's 'Rhea letter' Hoax," Journal
of Southern History, II (November, 1936), 481.
5Qlbid.. p. 482.
^llbid., p. 484.
^^Ibid.. p. 487^^Ibid., p. 496.
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In 1937, Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager published
The Growth of the American Republic in two volumes.

The authors wrote:

"The Seminoles were beaten, but Jackson had not finished.

Another forced

march through the jungle and Pensacola was taken, the Spanish governor
ejected, and the fortress garrisoned with Americans.Later, these
writers stated that "Adams had his way" regarding the support of the
general.55

Morison and Commager did not express any personal views con

cerning the justification of Jackson, however.
Charles and Mary Beard made the following statement in 19A4:
"Ordered by Monroe, after one of these attacks, to pursue a band of In
dian raiders to their retreat. General Andrew Jackson marched after them
into East Florida, where he did more than fight them.

He took possession

of the region.Like Morison and Commager, the Beards did not state
any opinions on the problem.
Asa E. Martin, in his two-voliame History of the United States,
published in 1946, asserted that the general was justified by the com
prehensive natxire of the War Department orders.

This historian did not

mention the "Rhea letter.
In 1952, George Dangerfield completed a study of the Monroe era.
He asserted that the Virginian was truly careless in not reading Jack
son's letter, as was Calhoun in not explaining it to him.

Both men

^^Samuel E. Morison and Henry S, Commager, The Growth of the
American Republic (2 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1937),
I, 346.
^^Ibid., I, 347.
^^Charles A, Beard and Mary R, Beard, A Basic History of the
United States (New York: The New Home Library, 19Z^4), p, I76,
^"^Asa E. Martin, History of the United States (2 vols.; Ginn and
Co., 1946), I, 466-67.
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certainly knew of the Tennessean's impetuousness and of the gravity of
the Florida situation.^®

The author also disproved the theory that

Rhea's letter of January 12, 1818, might have carried the desired hint,
because the time sequence did not make an answer possible.

But, as

Dangerfield remarked, "the general may not have been bothering about
dates.

59

Thus, while this writer did not justify Jackson's movements,

he nevertheless placed much of the blame on Monroe and Calhoun as well
for failing to give proper attention to the matter.
In addition, several^^other writers of the period failed to men
tion the controversy at all or did not express a view concerning the
problem.
Thus, most of the writers of the past four decades have been
reluctant to accept Jackson's statements that he had received a secret
authorization from Monroe to seize Spanish Florida.

Bassett, however,

led the faction which believed that the general misinterpreted another
letter from Rhea as the desired approval.

Stenberg went to the other

extreme, however, and stated that the "Rhea letter" was an invention
by the Jacksonians in or about 1830.

Most of the writers who expressed

opinions felt that the Bassett theory was too generous to Jackson, but

^®George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feeling (New York:
court. Brace, and Co., 1952), p. 140.

Har-

^^ibid., p. 139.
^"^Joseph T. Blau (ed.), Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy
(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947); Louis M. Hacker, The Shaping
of the American Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947);
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1945); Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Adminis
trative History. 1829-1861 (New York; The Macmi.ll.an Co., 1954)•
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they were not as willing to indict the hero as was Stenberg.

On the

other hand, a number of the authors felt that Jackson had been justified
in his actions in 1818, regardless of the implications of the alleged
"Rhea letter."

Their points of justification were basically the same

as those expressed by earlier writers.

^^Refer to Chapter III, pp. 76-78.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
This study in historiography has dealt with the controversies
that res tilted from the invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818 by Jackson.
After the tracing of the historical background of the affair, many view
points on the twin questions of the justification of Jackson and the
existence of the "Rhea letter" were presented.

To begin with, the views

of Jackson and his major contemporaries were considered.

Then, the

opinions of biographers and historians from 1819 to 1956 were examined.
This chapter will summarize the views on these two major ques
tions of the principal contemporaries and writers cited in the preceding
chapters.

Then, the groupings into which the historians have placed

themselves will be pointed out, and some generalizations will be made
concerning the methods by which certain authors apparently selected
their particular positions on the questions.

Also, some of the incon

sistencies of their findings will be mentioned.

In addition, the major

contributions to the controversy will be cited.

Finally, an effort

will be made to indicate the changing trends in the viewpoints of writers
during the different periods of history.

This study, however, is in no

way intended to bring about solutions to the questions of the justifi
cation of Jackson or the existence of the first "Rhea letter."
The contemporsu'y defense of Jackson's 1818 invasion of Spauaish
Florida was erected along four main lines:
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1) the comprehensive nature
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of his orders; 2) the principle of seHJ'-defense; 3) the misconduct of
some Spanish officials; and 4) the silence of the administration after
the receipt of Jackson's proposal of January 6, 1818,

Years later, a

fifth factor vias introduced; namely, that Jackson had received from
Monroe, through the medium of Rhea, the desired authorization to seize
all of East Florida,
On the other hand, the opponents of the hero not only refused to
accept the foregoing reasons, but also condemned him for transcending
his orders and violating the Constitution.

In addition, several of

Jackson's antagonists accused him of acting for personal gain.

There

was considerable evidence, however, that some of these men were motivated
by their own political ambitions.
The defense of the general, emanating mainly from the House, was
varied in nature,

Jackson himself, at one time or another, used all

five of the previously mentioned bases in explaining his movements.
But his admirers were more prone to select one or two reasons than to
use all of them.

Thus, the discretionary nature of Jackson's orders was

cited by Secretary of State Adams as well as by Poindexter and other
Representatives.

Several contemporaries emphasized the necessity of

seizing the territory in order to insure peace and secxirity for the
frontier.

Monroe, while never relenting from the conviction that Jack

son had transcended his orders, later partially explained the actions of
his general on the basis of self-defense.

Others who pleaded this cause

were Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Rhea, Lemuel Sawyer, David Walker, and many
of the same congressmen who defended Jackson on the grounds of the com
prehensiveness of his orders.

Monroe, Adsmis, and Poindexter referred to

the misconduct of the Spanish officials, while Crawford later said that
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Jackson should have been absolved from blame because the administration
failed to answer his letter of January 6,

Only Rhea, Judge Overton,

and Major Lee confirmed Jackson's story of the first "Rhea letter."
On the other hand, heavy opposition to Jackson came from the
House as well sis from the cabinet.

In the cabinet meetings, Monroe,

Calhoun, Crawford, and Wirt expressed the belief that the general had
exceeded his authority, and, therefore, had violated the Constitution.
This view was also expounded by Clay and several other Representatives.
Also, Cobb and Fuller stated that the defense of Jackson on the basis
of the law of self-defense was not warranted.

Moreover, Lowndes axid

Fuller expressed the opinion that the general had acted in order to
enhance his political stature.
While Jackson and a few of his followers professed in 1830-1831
that there had been a first "Rhea letter,'" Monroe was equally emphatic
in denying the allegation.

In this contention he was backed by his son-

in-law and secretary, Samuel Gouverneur, as well as by Adams.

Possibly

because of the heated political situation, leading figures like Calhoun,
Crawford, and Clay did not enter into the "Rhea letter" controversy.
Thus, it has been seen that the defense of Jackson in 1818-1819
was spearheaded by Adams in the cabinet and Poindexter in the House, as
well as by the general himself.

Actually, Jackson believed that his jus

tification was obvious; therefore, he never truly recognized the service
given him by Adams and others.

This was partially responsible for his

break with Adams which was opened after the election of 1824.

On the

other hand, the opposition to the general in 1818-1819 was led by Monroe,
Calhoun, and Clay.

Monroe and Calhoun, of course, later signified that

they had changed their stands somewhat, but Clay remained an outspoken
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critic of the general.

Of the leaders in the discussions held imme

diately after the Seminole campaign, only Jackson professed that there
had been a "Rhea letter."

Monroe and Adam.s positively denied the claim,

while Calhoun and Clay were silent on the question.

It is significant

to note that most of the biographers of these contemporary politicians
merely reflected the views of their subjects.
The views of the biographers and historians should also be re
viewed.

The biographers of Jackson almost unanimously supported his

contentions, with only two of these writers—^Karsner and Ahl—dissenting.
They mentioned numerous reasons for justification.

The comprehensive

nature of the Ifeir Department directives was cited by Frost, Brown, and
Johnson,

The necessity of protecting the frontier was used as the basis

for their defense of Jackson by Waldo, Jenkins, Benton, and Syrett.
addition, Waldo

In

and Brady argued that Jackson had been justified because

of the misconduct of certain Spanish officials.

Parton and Stunner

stressed the failure of the administration to respond to Jackson's pro
posal of January 6, 1818.

Parton also submitted the theory that perhaps

there had been a "Rhea letter" which Monroe had unknowingly authorized.
In 1916 Bassett introduced the interpretation that there had been a
letter from Rhea to Jackson, but that it did not deal with the invasion
of East Florida.

This letter, which evidently referred to the channel

ing of all War Department orders through the division coxrnisinder, appar
ently was misinterpreted by Jackson to contain the desired approval of
his proposed plan for seizing the Spanish territory.
later adopted the Bassett thesis.

Ogg and James

Of all the biographers of Jackson,

only Buell (I904) indicated that the general had been justified by an
actual "Rhea letter."

Ward alleged that the evidence produced against
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Jackson was insufficient to censure him.

He believed, moreover, that

the prosecution of Jackson had been based on political, rather than legal,
grounds.

Several writers did not express an opinion on the question of

justificat ion.
On the other hand, the biographers of Jackson's contemporaries
were more divided in their opinions.
fended him.

Only four of these writers de

Von Hoist, Clark and Bemis averred that Jackson was justi

fied on account of the silence of the administration, while Schurz men
tioned the principle of self-defense.

On the other hand, several biogra

phers were prone to condemn the general for violating his orders in order
to increase his personal power-

This view was expressed by Prentice,

Sargent, Morse, Gilman, Shipp, and Wiltse.

Colton merely believed that

Jackson had been acquitted in the House because it woiild have been worse
to bow down before the wishes of Spain.

Cresson stated that the acquisi

tion of the Floridas by diplomacy rather than by conquest had been neces
sary in order to preserve peace and remove the Indian menace.

Several

authors made no reference to the Florida affair.
The majority of the historians examined have tended to justify
the chieftain.

The principal reason cited by Hildreth and other early

writers was the necessity of protecting the frontier settlers from addi
tional Indian raids.

On the other hand, Babcock offered the unusual

observation that Jackson had been the innocent tool for the expansionistic plcuis of Monroe and Adams.

In addition, McMaster suggested that

Jackson had misinterpreted orders which were certainly comprehensive.
This view was later advanced by Andrews, Channing, and Martin.
But Schouler, Stenberg, and Dangerfield condemned Jackson for his
deeds.

Schouler attacked all of the bases for justification offered by
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the Jacksonians.

Stenberg also believed that Jackson had seized Florida

on his own initiative, for the purpose of "pressuring" the government
into holding the territory.

Thereby, according to Stenberg, the general

would have greatly increased his popularity among the masses.

Dsinger-

field simply said that there had been no necessity for the seizure of
the garrisons.

The other historiains cited in the text did not express

opinions.
Thus, on the question of justification, most of Jackson's biog
raphers defended him, while the majority of the biographers of his
contemporaries condemned him.

Most of the historians justified the

general, but the critics were much more vociferous than the defenders.
It is also interesting to note that the biographers of the major
contemporaries of Jackson tended to look at him and his actions through
the eyes of their subjects.

Of the Monroe biographers examined, two—

Oilman and Cresson—condemned the chieftain, while Styron did not offer
an opinion.

While most of the Adams writers, led by Clark and Bemis,

defended the hero, only Morse took an opposite view.

On the other hand,

most of the biographers of Calhoun, Crawford, and Clay condemned Jackson
for his Florida adventure.

Van Buren's biographies revealed little, be

cause the "Red Fox of Kinderhook" had cunningly kept as far removed from
the controversy as was possible.
There have been some rather obvious trends in the viewpoints of
the writers who have been examined.

For example, the authors of the

pre-Wbrld War I era spent more time discussing the justification of
Jackson than have the later writers.

Thirty-five authors from the early

period and twenty-nine writers from 1914 to 1956 have been studied.

In

the first group, seventeen justified the general, seven condemned him.
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and the rest had no opinion.

In the latter group, eleven backed Jack

son, six rejected his actions, and the remainder were silent.

Thus,

the percentage of writers who dealt with the problem was somewhat (ten
percent) higher among the historians of the early period.

While this

can be attributed in part to the fact that no new interpretations had
been developed in the field, some of the writers have undoubtedly chosen
to minimize the affair as long as the interpretations have remained un
changed.

Again, it must be said, the biographers and historians have

tended to view the Florida affair virtually the same as it was seen by
the major contemporaries.
The only new theories that have been presented have dealt with
the "Rhea letter" phase of the controversy.

The biographers of Jackson

made some important contributions in this area.

The early Jacksonian

writers did not deal with the question because Jackson's side of the
story was not fully known until 1854 when Benton printed his Thirty
Years' View.

But, in 1859, James Parton suggested that there might have

been a "Rhea letter" which Monroe had unknowingly authorized.

As was

previously mentioned, however, the most influential interpretation was
introduced by Bassett in 1916.

He then suggested that there had been a

letter written by Rhea to Jackson, but that it had dealt with an entirely
different matter.

When Bassett later uncovered the copy of a note

written on January 12, 1818, by Rhea to Jackson, he was convinced that
Jackson had misconstrued the intent of the missive.

This letter, which

was published in 1926, in his Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, read in
part:
I expected that you would receive the letter you allude to,
and it gives me pleasure to know you have it, for I was certain it
would be satisfactory to you. You see by it the sentiments of the
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Pres. [|ic3 respecting you are the same, as to me, I wish I could
do you any good. I have also received your letter of the 22nd.
last month, and read it carefully. I am gratified indeed that the
plan of the Pres. [sic^ is satisfactory to you. I am confident
that he intended it to be so.^
Bassett's influence has been reflected in the writings of several more
recent biographers and historians, notably Ogg and James.
Of the biographers of Jackson's contemporaries, none accepted his
"Rhea letter" story.

MacKenzie, Wiltse, and Bemis said that it was an

outright invention designed to assist Martin Van Buren in the struggle
against Calhoun for the succession.

Van Deusen asserted that the

general's memory must have failed him, while Oilman, Styron, and Cresson
simply stated that the "Rhea letter" had never existed.

On the other

hand, Clark and Coit reiterated Bassett's theory that Rhea had written
a letter but that it referred to an entirely different matter.

The

remainder of the writers did not deal with the controversy.
Of the pro-Jackson historians, only Andrews mentioned the exis
tence of the "Rhea letter," and he did not believe that the alleged
letter was ever written.

The anti-Jackson writers all attacked the

Tennessean for his story, hoyjever.

Schouler in 1884 asserted that the

letter, which had never been authorized by Monroe, had been invented to
complete the political discrediting of Calhoun.
more certain that the missive was a fabrication.

Stenberg in 1936 was
Dangerfield in 1952

stated that Bassett's theory that Jackson had misconstrued Rhea's refer
ence to another matter was disproved by a careful examination of the
dates involved.

•^John Spencer Bassett (ed.). Correspondence of Andrew Jackson
(6 vols.; Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1926-1935),
II, 348.
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Thus, the major contributions to the "Rhea letter" historiography
have been made by Schouler and Bassett,

TBiile Schouler was not original

in his opinion that the "Rhea letter" was a political fabrication, his
extensive treatment of the controversy undoubtedly inspired the later
research carried on by Stenberg and Dangerfield.

On the other hand,

Bassett's thesis concerning a letter written to Jackson by Rhea on
January 12, 1818, has had considerable impact upon later writers.

Some

have explained that, while there was no real "Rhea letter," Jackson
might have made an honest mistake.

With these factors in view, several

authors justified the general on the grounds that Monroe should have
written a dissenting letter if Jackson's plcins had not met with his
approval.
While the writers of the 1819-1914 period have given more atten
tion to the question of Jackson's justification than the later authors,
the latter have been more concerned about the "Rhea letter."

As the

Jackson story was not known until 1854* the comparisons made will in
volve the I854-I9I4 and 1914-1956 periods.

Twenty-one authors from the

early era and twenty-nine writers from the latter period were examined.
In the first group, six asserted that there was no "Rhea letter," while
fourteen had no opinion.

Only one writer. Hue11, claimed that there

actually was a first "Rhea letter."

In the latter era, fourteen wrote

negative comments, while the rest failed to express views.

Thus, of

the early writers thirty-three percent had opinions, while of the latter
group nearly half had viewpoints.

This increase can undoubtedly be

attributed to the influence of Schouler and Bassett.
There are some fascinating, inexplicable aspects that remain con
cerning the alleged "Rhea letter."

First of all, why did Monroe allegedly
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ignore Jackson's letter of January 6, 1818?

Even the general's fore

most critics have not been able to explain adequately why the President
of the United States neglected to read a letter that dealt with Florida
at a time when our government was negotiating for that territory.

More

over, the letter was from a commanding officer known for his impetuousness and disregard of legal niceties.

Secondly, why did Jackson

allegedly burn the "Rhea letter" without investigating the situation
more thoroughly?

Jackson insisted, of course, that he had trusted

Monroe and Rhea.

In addition, he pointed to a note in the margin oppo

site the letter of January 6, 1818, in his letterbook.

This entry stated

that the letter in question had been burned on April 12, 1818.
however, believed that this note was fictitious.

Stenberg,

He asserted that who

ever forged the entry in the letterbook made an error because the date
p
should have been April 12, 1819.
in the drama by John Rhea?

Third, what was the true role played

In December, 1818, Rhea had indicated that

he knew nothing about a "Rhea letter."

As late as 1827* in response to

a query from Monroe, Rhea assured the ex-President that they had not
3
discussed Jackson and Florida in January, 1818.

Yet, in 1831 he wrote

to Monroe insisting that the Virginian had authorized him to tell Jack
son to seize Florida.

Widely differing views concerning this inconsis

tency have been presented.

Bassett, of course, expounded the theory that

Rhea had transmitted information to Jackson in 1818 which dealt with an

^Richard R. Stenberg, "Jackson's 'Rhea letter' Hoax," Journal of
Southern History, II (November, 1936), 491.
^Stanislaus M. Hamilton (ed.). The VP?it^gs of James Monroe
(7 vols.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), VII, 139.
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entirely different matter.

Then, according to this writer, Rhea was too

aged in 1831 to recall the particulars of the situation.

But Danger-

field intimated in 1952 that the dates belied Bassett's theory, as
Jackson's letter of January 6 could not have possibly reached Washington
by January 12.

Therefore, the critics of Jackson believed that Rhea,

as a faithful foUovier, merely did what the Jacksonians ordered when he
wrote the second "Rhea letter."
Thus, in spite of the recent revival of interest, the "Rhea
letter" seems destined to remain an insoluble question.

Even with

Bassett's thesis, current opinion still reflects the forthright state
ment made in 1906 by Cyrus T. Brady:

"Nobody can explain this matter

satisfactorily now."^
Consequently, it appears that most historians and biographers
have accepted the conclusion of the House of Representatives that Jack
son was justified in his seizure of the Spanish posts in 1818.

An even

greater ntimber of writers, however, have agreed that Jackson was mis
taken in claiming that he had received a secret authorization from Monroe
in February, 1818.

This is true despite the recent efforts to defend the

hero on the basis of Bassett's thesis.
Thus, many absorbing facets of Jackson's Florida adventure have
been explored.

While no definite conclusions have been made, it is

hoped that, in some small way, this study will help to keep alive his
torical interest in this intriguing controversy.

^Refer to Chapter III, p. 64*
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